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INTRODUCTION
This paper is devoted wholly to section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the so-called unconscionability clause.' It is, how-
ever, not primarily an essay on commercial law. Rather it is intended
to be a study in statutory pathology, an examination in some depth of
the misdrafting of one section of a massive, codifying statute and the
misinterpretations which came to surround it. The paper therefore is
not intended as a commentary upon the content or drafting technique
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University Law School. B.A. 1956,
Amherst College. LL.B. 1959, Harvard University.
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1962). This is the current version of the
Code, which will be cited hereinafter as UCC. In the course of this paper various
other versions of the Code and its predecessor statutes will be cited: 1) NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF ComMIsSIoNERs ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROPOSED REPORT ON AND
DRAFT OF A REvISED UNIFORM SALES AcT (1941) [hereinafter cited as MIMEo 1941
D AFr]. There are two versions of the 1941 draft, one mimeographed and the other
printed. Only the former contains the text of the then predecessor to § 2-302. See
note 12 infra for further details. The printed version will be cited hereinafter as
PRINTED 1941 DRAFT. 2) NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, UNIFORM REvisED SALES ACT (Third Draft, 1943) [hereinafter cited
as 1943 DRAFT]. 3) AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SALEs SECTIONS (SALEs Act),
CouNcIL DRAFT No. 1 (1944) [hereinafter cited as FEB. 1944 DRAFT]. 4) AMERICAN
LAw INSTITUTE, UNIFORM REVISED SALES AcT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944)
[hereinafter cited as MAY 1944 DRAFT]. 5) AMmRCAN LAw INSTITUTE, THE CODE
OF COMMERCIAL LAw (1948) [hereinafter cited as 1948 DRAFr]. 6) AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (May 1949 Draft) [hereinafter cited as 1949
DRAFT]. 7) AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Proposed
Final Draft, 1950) [hereinafter cited as 1950 DRAFT]. 8) AMERICAN LAW INSTrruTE,
UNIFORM CommERCIAL CODE (Official Draft, 1952) [hereinafter cited as 1952 DRAFr].
Other drafts of the Code exist, see Braucher, The Legislative History of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLuM. L. REv. 798 n.1 (1958), but are not important
in tracing the development of the unconscionability provision of the Code.
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of the Code as a whole or even of the Sales article.' The focus of this
study is section 2-302, and excursions into other provisions of the
Code are made only to help illuminate that primary target.' Basic to
the justification of this narrow focus is the belief that such a carefully
limited study will be of interest transcending that particular section's
own substantive effect on the law, but that is not to say that section
2-302 was chosen at random, or that talk about its actual effect can
or will be avoided here. The section was chosen because of its intrinsic
interest and potential importance to both sales and contract law de-
velopment,4 already the subject of substantial controversy.' But the
primary weight of the essay will be on section 2-302 as a thing-in-itself
and how it got that way, rather than on what its operative effect
might be.
Let us begin the story the way so many good stories begin, with
ritual incantation: to make a contract one needs (i) parties with
capacity, (ii) manifested assent, and (iii) consideration.6 This is all
very simple.7 If these criteria are met, a party to the resulting nexus
2 The Code has already occasioned one of the great outpourings of legal commen-
tary in history. The following are the most extensive bibliographies of writings on
the Code: BOSTON COLLEGE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CO-ORDINATOR ANNOTATED
667-730 (1963); EZER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE BiBLoGRAPHY-1966 (1966)
("95% of the published materials"); GOODRICH & WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AmERI-
CAN LAw INSTITUTE 1923-1961 at 48-66 (1961); [1954] NEW YORK LAW REvISIoN
COmm'N REPORT 19-46 (N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(A)); WYPYsKI, THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LEGAL ARTICLES AND PUBLICATIONS (1954).
8 1 should not like to give the impression that I consider myself the discoverer of
§ 2-302. I have thus far noted in excess of 130 "discussions" of the unconscionability
provision in law reviews, bar journals, practice manuals, treatises and miscellaneous
studies. Most of the discussions are brief and superficially descriptive, but a number
have been directed primarily to § 2-302 and the unconscionability concept. See Note,
58 DICK. L. Rzv. 161 (1954); Note, 45 IowA L. REv. 843 (1960); Comment, 18 U.
C i. L. REv. 146 (1950) ; Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 401 (1961) ; Note, 45 VA. L. REv.
583 (1959) ; Note, 70 YALE L.J. 453 (1961) ; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954).
4 It has been suggested that the Code's unconscionability doctrine will not be
limited to the law of Sales for long, but is likely speedily to enter the general law
of contracts. 5A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1164, at 223 (1964) ; Note, 65 COLUm. L. REv.
880, 891-92 (1965). See also King, The New Conceptualism of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 30, 39-41, 43 (1966).
5 Noting the controversy: 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 44-48 (1964) ; Carrington, The Uniform Commercial Code
-- Sales, Bulk Sales and Documents of Title, 15 Wyo. L.J. 1, 7 (1961) ; Hawkland,
In re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 512, 513 (1955) ; Kripke, The Principles
Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321,
324. Critical or at least questioning: Buerger, The Sales Article of the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code, 23 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 116, 120 (1951); Douglass, Discussion
on Sales as Proposed in the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 OKLA. B.A.J. 808, 810
(1950) ; Goodwin, How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect
the Law of Sales in Oregon, 30 ORE. L. REv. 212, 213-14 (1951) ; Ireton, The Com-
nercial Code, 22 Miss. L.J. 273, 280 (1950) ; King, Suggested Changes in the Uni-
form Commercial Code-Sales, 33 ORE. L. REv. 113, 115-16 (1954); Levy, A Study
of the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 58 CoM. L.J. 329, 331 (1953).
6RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 19 (1932).
7This simplicity is, of course, of a rather special kind. Robert Frost once
remarked (at a "saying" of his poetry) : "e equals mc2 ; what's so hard about that?
Of course, what e, m and c are is harder."
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who has made promises is obligated to carry them out, unless he can
maintain successfully one of the standard contract-law defenses, such
as fraud, duress, mistake, impossibility or illegality." These "defenses"
might be classified in divers ways to serve various analytical purposes.
For our particular needs, however, there is a simple way of grouping
them which is signally illuminating: some of these defenses have to do
with the process of contracting and others have to do with the resulting
contract. When fraud and duress are involved, for instance, the focus
of attention is on what took place between the parties at the making
of the contract. With illegality, on the other hand, the material ques-
tion is instead the content of the contract once "made." ' The law
may legitimately be interested both in the way agreements come about
and in what they provide. A "contract" gotten at gunpoint may be
avoided; a classic dicker over Dobbin may come to naught if horse
owning is illegal. Hereafter, to distinguish the two interests, I shall
often refer to bargaining naughtiness as "procedural unconscion-
ability," and to evils in the resulting contract as "substantive uncon-
scionability."
Getting down to cases, section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code provides in its entirety as follows:
Section 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at
the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
If reading this section makes anything clear it is that reading this sec-
tion alone makes nothing clear about the meaning of "unconscionable"
except perhaps that it is pejorative." More particularly, one cannot
8 See RESTATEmE T, CONTRACTS §§ 19(d), 454-609 (1932).
9 It is possible in some cases for the contracting process to be illegal while per-
formance of the contract is not. See 6A CoaRiN, CONTRACTS § 1373 (1962).
' As one would suspect from its linguistic structure alone, which is the negativing
of the root concept of "conscience." See WEBsTER, NEv INTERNATioNAL DicrioNARY
OF THE ENGLiSH LANWUAGE 2763 (2d ed. 1957). The examples of its use collected
in 11 OxFoRD ENGLisH DicroNARY U-99 (1933) show the word to have been used
through the ages as a rather generalized pejorative intensifier, a wide-gauge "snarl
word." See HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN AIQoN 76-79 (1941).
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tell from the statute whether the key concept is something to be
predicated on the bargaining process or on the bargain or on some
combination of the two, that is, to use our terminology, whether it is
procedural or substantive. Nonetheless, determining whether the sec-
tion's target is a species of quasi-fraud or quasi-duress, or whether it is
a species of quasi-illegality, is obviously the key to the bite and scope
of the provision.
One central thesis of this essay is that the draftsmen " failed fully
to appreciate the significance of the unconscionability concept's neces-
sary procedure-substance dichotomy and that such failure is one of
the primary reasons for section 2-302's final amorphous unintelli-
gibility and its accompanying commentary's final irrelevance. This I
think can most clearly be shown by an examination in detail of the
drafting history of the provision and its accompanying comments, from
the beginning (prior to 1941) to the present version. The examination
will proceed first from the point of view of what that history discloses
about the transformations of procedural unconscionability, and then
the focus will shift to substantive unconscionability. Thereafter, I
shall examine the equity-specific performance "unconscionability" doc-
trine, to show its total inapplicability to the problems dealt with in the
Code, hence pointing out the irrelevance of substantially all of the
standard commentary on the section. I shall close by examining the
reported cases thus far affected by section 2-302, and their dangerous
11 1 shall use "draftsmen" throughout to refer to that imaginary construct which
corporately produced the final Code and the final version of § 2-302. From time to
time I shall use the singular form "draftsman," to refer to the late Karl Llewellyn
who, at least at the earliest drafting stages, did the major share of the actual drafting,
especially of the Sales article. See Braucher, supra note 1, at 800; Mooney, Old
Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our
New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 223 (1966). And see the early and
amusing evaluation in Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 330 (1951), where the Code is continually referred
to as the "lex Llewellyn." But see Llewellyn, Why A Commercial Code?, 22 TENN.
L. REv. 779, 784 (1953) : "there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in
but I was voted down."
It became an article of faith for the defenders of the Code to assert that no single
man or group had a monopoly of the drafting of the Code, especially (during the
height of the adoption push) not law professors. There are a goodly number of
articles on who "really" drafted the Code, taking somewhat divergent views. See,
suggesting that the professors really ruled, Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (P) Com-
mercial Code Should Not Be Adopted in Ohio, 14 OHIo ST. L.J. 3, 6-7 (1953) (con-
spiracy between professors and successful lawyers); Kripke, The Principles Under-
lying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 321-28;
Levy, A Study of the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 58 Com. L.J. 329 (1953).
Among the works defending against this academic-orientation canard are Godfrey,
Preview of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 ALBANY L. REv. 22, 25-26 (1952);
Kuhns, Uniform Commercial Code, 16 TEx. B.J. 67, 68 (1953); Malcolm, The Uni-
form Commercial Code, 39 ORE. L. R v. 318, 323 (1960) ; Mentschikoff, The Uniform
Commercial Code, An Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A.J. 419 (1950);
Note, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 880, 887 (1965).
The part Professor Llewellyn played in the final form of § 2-302 is hard to assess.
In his later writings about it he expressed neither hostility to the section nor much
faith in it. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960).
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(though understandable) tendency. The central purpose of the paper
will be to illustrate the progressive abstraction, attentuation and even-
tual destruction of meaning in an important single statutory provision,
in response to pressures the nature of which can only be guessed.
PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY
Drafting History
In 1941 there appeared publicly for the first time the provision
which eventually became section 2-302 of the Code.' In that earliest
draft at least, there was substantial evidence that the draftsman intended
to provide that if a contract or portion thereof were in fact the subject
of some (not quite specified) level of particularized bargaining, it
would be safe from judicial rewriting. This original tack must be
emphasized. From the beginning the procedural unconscionability
question was not posed in terms of what bargaining conduct, if any,
would vitiate the agreement, but rather in terms of whether there
was bargaining conduct sufficient to insulate from judicial interference
a contract which was, arguably, substantively "unconscionable." The
draft provision at one point indicated that view quite distinctly:
When both of the parties have so directed their attention
to a particular point that . . . variance from this Act may
fairly be regarded as the deliberate desire of both, and as
reflecting a considered bargain on that particular point . . .
the legislature recognizes that policy in general requires the
parties' particular bargain to control.
13
Other portions of the provision helped to reinforce this idea that
bargaining of some dimension would validate any contractual term,
for instance the clear statement that the section's policy was "to aid
12 MImEo 1941 DRAFT § 1-C. This draft is identified in a covering letter dated
September 5, 1941, from Professor Llewellyn (then at Columbia Law School) to
Professor Underhill Moore at Yale Law School, as a "Second Draft of a Revised
Sales Act, for the Committee's discussion . . . Sept. 19-22." Section 1-C is new in
this draft. (The letter is bound in with the Yale Law School Library's copy of the
mimeographed 1941 draft.)
The 1941 mimeographed version is apparently not very widely available. For our
purposes the mimeographed 1941 draft is particularly important, for in the printed
1941 version (copies of which exist in abundance), § 1-C is omitted, and at the point
at which the section would have appeared, there appears: "[Section 1-C. (New to
Sales Act). Form Contracts and Particularized Terins. This section was withdrawn
by the Committee .... ]"
13Mimtio 1941 DRAFT §1-C(1)(b). Section 1-C was no ordinary statutory
provision. It runs ninety-nine lines (almost three full pages), is accompanied by
almost five pages of commentary and the "Report" accompanying the draft and its
comment devotes the greater part of an additional four pages primarily to its ex-
plication.
The draftsman's defense against any suggestion that such fullness might approach
fulsomeness may be found as part of § 1-C, comment B(1). It is not reprinted in
PRiNTED 1941 DRA.
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and foster any considered and deliberate action of the parties." 14 More-
over, the accompanying comments further reinforced that interpretation:
The principle of freedom of bargain is a principle of
freedom of intended bargain. It requires what the parties'
[sic] have bargained out to stand as the parties have shaped
it, subject only to certain overriding rules of public policy.
. Displacement of these balanced backgrounds [provided
by the Code] is not to be assumed as intended unless de-
liberate intent is shown that they shall be displaced .... 15
On the other hand, there were hints that perhaps there were some
contracts or clauses which, under the general rubric of "unconscion-
ability," would not be enforced regardless of what the bargaining process
was like. For instance, the sentence quoted above about the section's
policy to "aid and foster the considered and deliberate action of the
parties" closed with what might have been a limiting condition: "in
substituting for the general rules of this Act a fair and balanced set of
provisions more particularly fitted to the needs of any particular trade
or situation." 16 This might mean that "considered and deliberate
action" which resulted in unfair and unbalanced provisions not re-
quired by the "needs" of any particular trade or business would not
be binding on the parties. But how that situation was to be treated
under the section was not clear, even to the draftsman, one suspects.
The idea might have been that the unbalanced nature of the resulting
terms was evidence that, despite appearances, there was not after all
the requisite bargaining. At another point the section provided:
If the bloc [of form provisions] as a whole is shown
affirmatively to work a displacement or modification of the
provisions of this Act in an unfair and unbalanced fashion
not required by the circumstances of the trade, then the
party claiming application of any particular provision in
14 MIMEo 1941 DRAFr § 1-C(1) (e). In addition to this picture of what man-to-
man bargaining would be sufficient to validate a departure from the Code rules, the
1941 Draft also envisioned valid form contracts arrived at through groups bargaining
for a particular trade or industry. If a form contract were thus arrived at to govern
a particular trade, and that bargaining procedure were "fair," then the modified
contract would be impregnable.
The draft provided:
The legislature also recognizes that particular trades and situations often
require extensive special regulation in a manner departing from the general
provisions of this Act, and that speed and convenience in transacting business
may require such extensive departures to be incorporated into a general form
contract, or into "rules" to which particular transactions are made subject,
although the details of such "rules" or forms are not so deliberated on and
bargained by the two parties when they are closing an individual transaction
as to become particularized terms of the bargain.
MImEO 1941 DRAFT § 1-C(1)(c).
This validation-by-proxy technique totally disappeared after the 1941 draft.
15MIMEo 1941 DRAFT § 1-C, comment A(3), at 18. (Emphasis in original.)
16 MxFO 1941 DRAFT § l-C(1) (e).
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such bloc must show that the other party, with due knowledge
of the contents of that particular provision, intended that
provision to displace or modify the relevant provision of this
Act in regard to the particular transaction.17
In fact, the section and its accompanying commentary really spoke
throughout as if it were inconceivable that there could exist simul-
taneously both particularized bargaining and an unfair contract. The
idea seems almost to have been that if a clause with which businessmen
have been living looks unfair to an outsider it is only because he fails
to understand the particular context.
Many groups of clauses in very frequent use in the Sales
field are utterly one-sided, but are, for all that, entirely fair
because they correct in a reasonable way an unfortunate
condition in the law.'8
Thus, it is just not clear under the 1941 version what result would
be reached with respect to a provision, or a block of provisions, or an
entire contract which not only looked one-sided but was one-sided. In
other words, if the complaining party, at the time he entered into the
contract, knew the nature of the "intended bargain," " and had "due
knowledge of the contents of that particular provision," 20 but was in
no bargaining position to get any changes made, would a contract
entered into under such circumstances, no matter what its terms,
be safe?
The only fair answer, I think, is that one cannot tell for sure. No
doubt the overall drift of the section was that contracts ought to be
"fair and balanced" no matter how the parties bargained, but at least
as far as its explicit language went, the draft section also was com-
mitted to the view that explicit bargaining would insulate a contract:
if A and B actually bargained over each clause of a contract, and each
came out the way A wanted it, the contract would stand even if ex-
tremely onerous to B. One of the central problems of the section,
therefore, arose as early as 1941: what, if anything, will insulate a
contract from 2-302? The 1941 draft used several locutions to en-
visage an apparently very stringent bargaining standard which might
succeed, but the problem remained radically unsolved.
The 1941 draft of the section did not survive its first exposure
to the light. It was "withdrawn by the [drafting] committee" because
the "machinery for administration thus far developed" was thought to
be "inadequate" and "too unreckonable to be in keeping with the lines
17 MIMEo 1941 DRaF §1-C(2) (a) (i).
Is MimEo 1941 Ds-r § l-C, comment A(6), at 19.
19 MimEo 1941 DRr § l-C, comment A(3), at 18.
20 fmnxo 1941 DRa § 1-C(2) (a) (i).
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of the draft." 21 Perhaps because of these "machinery" and "reckon-
ability" problems, when the third draft of the Uniform Revised Sales
Act came out in August 1943, matters on the unconscionability front
were materially changed. This new predecessor to 2-302 read as
follows:
SECTION 24. FORM CLAUSES, CONSCIONABLE AND UN-
CONSCIONABLE. (1) A party who signs or accepts a writing
evidencing a contract for sale which contains or incorporates
one or more form clauses presented by the other party is
bound by them unless the writing when read in its entirety
including the form clauses is an unconscionable contract and
he has not in fact read the form clauses before contracting,
except that a merchant who signs and returns such a writing
after having had a reasonable time to read it is bound by it.'
This version clearly lacked much of the salvator mundi touch of the
1941 draft. The section was explicitly made applicable to "form
clauses" only.' The power to bind someone to something which he
had merely read, seemingly extinguished in the 1941 draft, was here
clearly resuscitated. Moreover, for merchants,' under the 1943 ver-
sion, not even reading was necessary; so long as they had had sufficient
opportunity to read, they were bound. The accompanying comment 5
was quite explicit. Where the 1941 comment spoke in terms of "de-
liberate intent," 2 the 1943 comment began:
The situation which gives rise to the section is the increasing
use of forms prepared by one party which are not in fact
examined by the other at the time of contracting .... "
In short, between 1941 and 1943 the provision moved from a search
for words to paint pictures of haggling to a search for words for ex-
pressing merely looking and reading."
21 PRINTED 1941 DRAFT 51-52.
22 1943 DRAFT § 24. This version contained two additional subsections, subsection
(2) providing that any form recital that clauses were read was to be disregarded,
and subsection (3) detailing the alternative procedures open to the court once it
made a finding of unconscionability (including reformation, excision and nullification).
23 The heading of MImEO 1941 DRAFT § 1-C read: "Declaration of Policy, and
Procedure with Regard to Displacement of Single Provisions or Groups of Provisions
by Agreement." The heading of 1943 DaATr read: "Form Clauses, Conscionable and
Unconscionable."
24 See UCC § 2-104(1) for the Code's definition of "merchant."
25 Strictly speaking, there is no "comment" to this 1943 draft There is, however,
a mimeographed document entitled Informal Appendix to Revised Uniform Sales Act,
Third Draft, 1943, Tentative Sketch of Material for Comments (1943). This appendix
was "submitted on the sole responsibility of the draftsman," i.e., Professor Llewellyn.2 6 MIMEo 1941 DRAFr § 1-C, comment A(3), at 19.
2 7 Infornmal Appendix, supra note 25, at 11. (Emphasis added.)
28 Even here, however, one must beware. The end of that portion of the "Informal
Appendix" devoted to § 24 (the then foetal form of § 2-302) referred to "matters
which were not particularly discussed by the parties." Id. at 12. (Emphasis added.)
That seems to imply that the draftsman may still have had in mind something more
than mere reading.
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This 1943 draft, however, was destined to be the section's high
point of permissiveness. By February 1944, when the next published
draft was submitted to the Council of the American Law Institute,
while the special merchant's provision remained intact, the clause "and
he has not in fact read the form clauses before contracting" was
eliminated. 9 By May 1944, when the draft was submitted by the
Council to the Institute's membership (by which time the draftsmen
had hopefully labelled it "Proposed Final Draft No. 1"), even the
special merchant provision was gone.3°
Oddly enough, it is not immediately clear what the effect of those
changes might have been. The reference to "reading" in the prior
draft might have been eliminated because the draftsmen felt that mere
reading ought not to be a sufficient insulating factor, but that some-
thing further ought also be shown to save the contract-perhaps that
the clause not only be read but understood,3 or perhaps even that
actual haggling have taken place. That is, the elimination of the
reference to "reading" may have been an attempt merely to return
the section to the stringent procedural requirements of the 1941 draft.
On the other hand, the elimination of the reference to reading
might be understood more simply. When one draft of a statute pro-
vides that a clause will be vulnerable if it is both (1) "unconscionable"
and (2) not read, and the next draft removes any reference to reading,
one might fairly conclude that when a contract or clause is unconscion-
able, it is unconscionable, and no amount of reading or bargaining or
understanding will make any difference. Such a reading leads, obvi-
ously, to the more radical of the positions which may have been
contained in the 1941 draft, that even contracts or clauses which were
expressly bargained about might be stricken or modified if "uncon-
scionable." Admittedly this seems not to have been the major thrust
of the earliest draft. Under the 1941 formulation it appeared that
some amount of bargaining fullness would rescue any contract or
clause.3 But the May 1944 draft might have meant that substantive
unconscionability alone could vitiate any provision, and no amount
of procedural "superconscionability" could save it.
This interpretation, however, runs into an objection other than
radicalism. If the bargaining procedure were to be considered irrele-
29 See FEB. 1944 DRAFT § 23.
30 See MAY 1944 DArr § 23.
31Cf. MimEo 1941 DaArr § 1-C(2) (a) (i) with its suggestive "due knowledge
of the contents of that particular provision."
32 Subject, of course, to the usual illegality limitations. Cf. MIMEO 1941 DRAFr
§ 1-C, comment A(3), at 18:
The principle of freedom of bargain . . . . requires what the parties'
[sic] have bargained out to stand as the parties have shaped it, subject only
to certain overriding rules of public policy. (Emphasis in original.)
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vant to the conscionability determination, why would the section be
explicitly limited to "form clauses"? 3 Should a bargained-about
form clause be any worse off under the section than a bargained-about
clause created for the occasion? It seems somehow an unlikely result
that if a party arrives with a blank sheet of paper and writes clause X
upon it, clause X will be invulnerable no matter what it says, but if
he comes with a form on which appears clause X, even if he and the
other party dicker over it specifically, clause X may be later stricken
by the court. The fact that a particular clause is part of a form has no
bearing upon its effect, that is, upon its substantive conscionability; its
form-genesis is relevant only if the nature of the bargaining process
is relevant to the section.
The 1944 draft, therefore, was highly unstable. The reference to
"reading" from the prior draft was gone; no new standard for suffi-
cient bargaining was supplied; and yet the section was applicable by
its terms only to form contracts, thus making procedural factors rele-
vant. This obvious tension between per se unconscionability and un-
conscionability to which the bargaining process was material could
not remain long unsettled. In fact, the most surprising thing is that
the draftsmen managed to put off the choice as long as they did, until
1948. In that year's version of the unconscionability section the
ambiguity contained in the previous drafts was dispelled. The section
read in its entirety as follows:
Section 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court finds the contract to be unconscionable,
it may refuse to enforce the contract or strike any uncon-
scionable clauses and enforce the rest of the contract or sub-
stitute for the stricken clause such provisions as would be
implied under this Act if the stricken clause had never existed.
(2) A contract not unconscionable in its entirety but
containing an unconscionable clause, whether a form clause
or not, may be enforced with any such clause stricken.34
There is one hint in the section (without reference to its accompanying
comment) which indicates that a doctrine of per se unconscionability
had been chosen: the limited application of the section only to "form"
33 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
34 1948 DRArr § 2-302. The changes in this version may have been conceived
well before 1948. There is a mimeographed version of the sales article extant dated
"as of 4/1/46" which is identical with the 1948 and 1949 versions (though possessing
no comments). See AmEmlcAx LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFORM REvIsED SALEs AcT (1946).
It may be well to note here that there likely are other vagrant mimeographed
versions of the Code or portions thereof which I have not seen, my searching having
been limited substantially to the Columbia, New York University, Yale and Washing-
ton University Law Libraries.
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contracts was eliminated."5 In fact, this draft's sole reference to form
clauses was inserted only to make clear that whether the clause was
a form clause or not was irrelevant."0 Thus, though once again the
language of the statute falls somewhat short of limpidity, one gains
the impression that the draftsmen might have decided to make "un-
conscionability" in at least some cases independent of the bargaining
process.
And for once the natural inference drawn from the section was
clinched by the accompanying commentary. The third comment to
this 1949 version dealt specifically with procedural unconscionability.
It read as follows:
A common type of unconscionable clause within this
section consists of cases in which the contents of the question-
able clause were never actually discussed or bargained out by
the parties and as a result the clause was included in the
agreement without one party's attention ever having been
directed specifically to it. This situation arises most fre-
quently with respect to "form" contracts where the attention
of the other party is addressed to the bargained terms which
are filled in.37
What is most noteworthy about this comment, I think, especially in
the light of what the fourth comment was to say, is that the draftsmen
apparently found it exceedingly difficult to pin down exactly what was
worrying them concerning procedural unconscionability. In one short
paragraph they described the bargaining vice as a failure of discussion,
a failure of bargaining and a failure to have one's attention "directed
specifically" to a clause. Perhaps it was this difficulty in pinning down
the naughty bargaining conduct which prompted the fourth comment,
which read as follows:
Another common type of situation arising in connection
with unconscionable contracts or clauses consists of cases
where one party has deliberately entered into a lopsided
bargain with full knowledge and awareness and has actually
assented to clauses which are unconscionable in effect against
him. In such cases this Article goes on the theory that sales
contracts have as their legally necessary effect certain mini-
mum incidents set forth in this Article despite any agreement
3a This version is the first printed version which does not mention "form" con-
tracts in the title, but instead substitutes a reference to "unconscionable" contracts.
Permit me to suggest that you close your eyes and try to Picture, respectively, a
"form" contract and then an "unconscionable" contract.
3 1948 DRAFT § 23. This, it should be pointed out, is in itself a pretty peculiar
form of drafting, to negative an impression which could have been gained only by
having read previous drafts of a section.
371949 DRaFT § 2-302, comment 3. The text of the section in the 1949 DRAFT
(which contained comments) was identical with 1948 DaFT § 23.
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of the parties to the contrary. The question primarily is
whether or not a contract for sale in a business sense was
intended. If so, then the transaction is governed by this
Article and its minimum legal effects are laid down by the
law as embodied in this Article. Therefore, the court may,
under this section, refuse to enforce the clause or agreement
as unconscionable and declare that the provisions of this
Article be made operative instead.8s
This comment seems to have the effect (even if not conscious) of
making the immediately previous one irrelevant and atavistic. Inter-
preting section 2-302 along the lines suggested by this fourth comment
has the natural effect of solving, at one swoop, substantially all of the
problems one might have in deciding upon, classifying and conveying
in language to another just what contracting conduct is objectionable.
One merely drops the question. The process of getting the clause
becomes unimportant. An unconscionable clause is unconscionable.
But the price paid for this facile solution is to increase immensely the
weight which has to be borne by the definition of "unconscionable" as
a substantive thing, because now that decision may be made without
reference to the bargaining process at all. That does not mean that
it must be so made, but the net result is to make it possible under the
section to strike a single provision in a contract even if it had been
specifically bargained about and even if it were not forbidden by any
established doctrine of illegality or public policy, solely on the basis
of an ad hoc judicial determination of substantive "unconscionability."
Such a position, even though fraught with difficulties and some-
what radical, had all the virtues of clarity. Moreover, the world would
not have come to an end if that position on the definition of "uncon-
scionability'.' had been the one finally adopted. As a matter of statutory
draftsmanship, after wrestling with the serious policy problems involved,
one might have decided to make the bargaining process irrelevant.
The draftsmen in the earlier drafts had tried to make the bargaining
process relevant, and had encountered immense difficulties in describing
the mechanics and details of that relevance. This 1949 draft cut the
developing Gordian knot by saying, in effect, that an unconscionable
clause is an unconscionable clause, no matter how it got into the
contract. The policy determination was made, in effect, that one
could use his superior bargaining power only so far. A legislature being
presented with the 1949 draft would have had a fighting chance of
knowing what it was being called upon to import into the law of Sales.
Alas, the draftsmen's impulse toward transparency of intention
was but ephemeral. It lasted only until the next printed draft of the
38 1949 DRAr § 2-302, comment 4.
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Code came out in May 1950. The statute itself remained almost un-
changed from its 1949 incarnation.89 But the comments, oh my,
the comments. As a starter, comments 3 and 4 from the prior version,
the two comments which explicitly discussed and distinguished sub-
stantive and procedural unconscionability, were totally deleted. There
was substituted, however, a newly minted first comment, which read
in its entirety as follows:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts
to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they
find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been
accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manip-
ulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determination
that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant
purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow
the court to pass on the unconscionability of the contract or
particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law as
to its unconscionability. The basic test is whether in the light
of the general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case the clauses involved are
so one-sided as not to be expected to be included in the agree-
ment. The principal [sic] is one of prevention of unfair
surprises and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because
of superior bargaining power. The underlying basis of this
section is illustrated by the results in cases such as the
following ... .o
As I shall discuss anon, this new comment raised substantial problems
through its obfuscation of what "unconscionability" as a substantive
thing applicable to a single contractual provision might be. But equally
significant was the diffusion of the section's attitude toward contracting
conduct. Briefly put, is the manner in which a provision gets into a
contract relevant or not? If the contracting process is relevant, what
standards does one use to judge the adequacy of that process? Is
"reading" enough (can you or can't you be surprised by what you
have read?) or "understanding" or "bargaining"? If some form of
bargaining over a specific clause goes on, but the seller can and does
adopt a take-it-or-leave-it position, is the buyer bound if he takes it?
The important thing is not so much that the comment to the 1950
version does not clearly answer those particular questions, but that
it clearly replaced a draft which did.
S9 The second subsection of the 1949 DRArr § 2-302, see text at note 34 msipra,
was eliminated, the first subsection having added to it the language italicized below:
"If the court finds the contract or any clause of the contract to be unconscionable,
it may .... " This was tighter drafting, certainly, but made no change of substance.
40 1950 DRAr" § 2-302, comment 1. Following the colon were the ten cases cited
in the current version of the Code.
1967]
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The 1949 version's confrontation of the difficulty was to be the
last; succeeding drafts of 2-302 were to back further and further away
from any stand on the relevance of contracting procedure to a finding
of "unconscionability." While the section itself did not change in any
manner material to that problem after the 1950 changes, the comments
did-subtly perhaps, but importantly." For instance, the 1950 com-
ment had described an unconscionable clause as one "so one sided as
not to be expected." The comment to the 1952 draft, however, con-
demned instead clauses "so one sided as to be unconscionable." ' This
particular transformation I find most instructive on the development
of 2-302's language in general. The 1950 comment had pointed to
a recognizable human situation; it had, if you will, a dramatic situation
somewhere behind it. It may have been impossible to tell in advance
what clause might turn out to be so unexpectable as to be unfairly
surprising, but at least it was clear that one was looking for one of
the indicia of surprise-a dropped jaw, perhaps. Some variation from
what a contracting party might reasonably have been lulled into ex-
pecting (or, more likely, not expecting) was the focus. That would
be a scene describing the interaction of real people. Obviously relevant
to unconscionability posed as a question of "surprise" would be whether
the clause ought to have been pointed out especially, or explained, or at
the very least not hidden in fine print and verbal complexity. The
test might have been stated, "if he had read this clause, and if he had
understood it, what is it likely that he would have done?" If the
answer were "exclaimed" or "questioned" or even perhaps "looked
quizzical" (the expected reaction need not have been at the level of a
silent-movie seduction) then there might arguably have been enough
wrong with such a clause's method of importation into the contract to
justify its lancing. The 1950 comment at least made the question one
of a person's state of mind, and its factual justification. But when it
was decided in the 1952 draft to describe unconscionability as "so one-
4 1 This propensity of the draftsmen to make material changes in the Code by
modifying the comment rather than the statute has not gone unnoticed. See Surrency,
Research in the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 404, 408; Report on
Article 2--Sales by Certain Members of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School
[Professors Braucher, Kaplan, McCurdy & Sutherlandl, 6 Bus. LAw. 151, 153 (1951);
Note, 71 HARV. L. RE v. 674, 686 (1958).
1950 DRAFT provided that the comments might "be consulted by the courts to
determine the underlying reasons, purposes and policies of this Act and may be used
as a guide in its construction and operation." 1950 DRAF § 1-102(2). The next
draft provided that the comments might be consulted "in the construction and appli-
cation" of the Code, "but if text and comment conflict text controls." 1952 DRAFT
§ 1-102(3) (f). The present version of the Code has no provision dealing with the
status of the comments at all. Surrency, supra at 407-08, suggests that it was omitted
after 1952 "because the old comments were out of date" and the draftsmen didn't
know when they would be able to produce new ones. The present commentary to
§ 2-302 is substantially the same as it was in 1950.
42 Compare 1950 DRAFT § 2-302, comment 1, with 1952 DRAFT § 2-302, comment 1.
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sided as to be unconscionable," all dramatic focus was destroyed. The
movement of the drafting was from definition in terms of drama to
definition in terms of abstraction. By 1952 unconscionability was de-
fined in terms of itself.
Still another major change was made in the 1952 comment. To
the draft as it appeared in 1950 the material indicated by italics below
was added:
The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise (Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wents, 172 F. 2d
80, 3d Cir. 1948) and not of disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power.4
The relevance, if any, of the Campbell Soup decision and the doctrine
of equity unconscionability will be discussed shortly. At this point,
however, while the historical progression of the treatment of pro-
cedural unconscionability is being surveyed, it is especially illuminating
to discuss what "oppression" might possibly have meant. Given the
emerging diffusing trend of the statute brought to its peak in this 1952
draft,44 it should come as no surprise to anyone to discover that the
word "oppression," apparently chosen to clarify the meaning of un-
conscionability, should be almost perfectly ambiguous. Oppression,
strictly as a linguistic and syntactical matter, might refer to what took
place between the parties at the time they entered into the contract in
question (a sort of quasi-duress), or it might just as well refer to
the effect of that contract upon the complaining party. As it happens,
it is not easy to think of a word better designed to leave in a state of
perfect uncertainty whether the focus of the section was to be upon
the contracting process or the contract.
If one takes the position that "oppression" refers to the nature of
the contract rather than to the contracting process, then the word may
add to one's feeling for what "unconscionability" might be: it is some-
thing that is not only unexpected but hard on the complaining party.
That harshness should be a component of unconscionability will hardly
come as startling illumination to anyone, but it does add some explicit
coloration to an implicit expectation. If, however, "oppression" de-
scribes something in the bargaining process, one' is merely more
puzzled. Prior to its appearance one would have, under the guidance
of the reference to "unfair surprises," focused his attention upon
various modes of deception which might have been practiced on the
43 1952 DRaAr § 2-302, comment 1.
44 Note, for instance, this subtle linguistic modification: the 1950 draft's "sur-
prises" became in the 1952 draft "surprise." This is a nice example of the progressive
regression of § 2-302's language from recognizable commercial "plot" to abstraction.
Substituting "surprise" for "surprises" has much the same effect as substituting the
abstract plural "man" for the pictorial plural "men."
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complaining party. One would have looked to factors such as absence
of opportunity to read or ability to read, the size of the type used, the
unnecessary verbal complexity of the provision in question and so forth.
What factors would suffice to do the trick might not be clear, but the
relevant inquiry would have been intelligibly circumscribed.45 With
the suggestion that "oppression" was to be henceforth relevant, how-
ever, there appeared a new dimension. It was as if the comment had
said that if for some reason the aggrieved party could not effectively
have objected to the provision in question, even if he knew about it
and understood it, that is, even if he were not surprised, then the pro-
vision would still be destructible as unconscionable. What could be
clearer ?
Well, what could be clearer, and what in fact was clearer, was
the statement in the 1949 draft comment that it was the intention of
the draftsmen to cover those clauses which in fact were totally bar-
gained but just too harsh to permit. 6 That particularly explicit com-
ment, however, was eliminated very shortly after it appeared. Is one
to take that the gist of that comment was deemed to have returned with
all of its vigor in this new compressed form? I am easily churlish
enough to suggest that drafting compression has its limits, and that
if one were trying to convey such a signally radical position it would
have been well to do so in a somewhat less Delphic manner than by
the unexplained insertion of the single word "oppression." Moreover,
even this circuitous implication that the full meaning of "oppression"
encompassed "forced by strong bargaining" is somewhat lessened by
the presence in the 1952 draft of an element which did not appear in
the 1949 version, the express disclaimer of any intention to meddle
with "superior bargaining power." 17 Since "true" duress expectedly
remained an available defense in commercial contracts even after the
adoption of the Code,4" "oppression" must lie somewhere between
duress and superior bargaining power, a rather narrow niche indeed.4"
Why all this ambiguity?
45 One Would emphasize in any opinion the factors which would prevent the
complaining party from reading and understanding, for instance, general mechanical
reading difficulties, Siegelmap v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 208-10 (2d
Cir. 1955) (appendix showing back of steamship ticket), or personal reading diffi-
culties, Fricke v. Isbrandtson Co., 151 F. Supp. 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (steamship
ticket in language party didn't know). This focus is behind the baggage-check cases,
see, e.g., Klar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 270 App. Div. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285
(1946), aff'd inem., 296 N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947), and the treatment often
accorded generally to fine print. See Vogel & Bernstein, Fine Print, 21 Bus. LAW.
544 (1966) ; Note, 63 H~Av. L. REv. 494 (1950).
46 1949 DRAT § 2-302, comment 4.
47 1952 DRAFT § 2-302, comment 1.
48 See UCC § 1-103.
49 If it is intended to be a shorthand way of referring to some concept like "busi-
ness duress" or "duress of goods," it is an almost grotesquely foreshortened way of
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The answer, I think, is reasonably clear. The draftsmen were
faced with several possibilities. They could have said that if a certain
level of bargaining elaborateness were reached, any resulting contract
(short of illegality) would be invulnerable to later judicial meddling.
That, however, would most likely have necessitated some fuller de-
scription of what type of bargaining procedure was envisioned as
sufficiently immunizing. That is, they would have had to return to
what seems to have been the basic conception (though not necessarily
to the exact language or to the discursive style) of the original 1941
version. This, as the earliest draft itself showed, presented exceedingly
difficult drafting problems. Alternatively, the draftsmen could finally
have espoused the position taken in the 1949 draft, that there were
some contractual provisions, presently unspecifiable, which could not
be permitted under the Code no matter how fully bargained between
the parties. This position, however, might well have been unacceptable
to important backers of the Code 5o (not to mention to legislatures) if
it had been set forth in the high relief in which it was graven in the
1949 comment. Thus faced with a dilemma, the difficulty of the first
alternative and the unpopularity of the second, the draftsmen opted
for a third solution. They fudged.
The Official-Comment Cases
There are clues, however, that illumine the draftmen's actual con-
ception of procedural unconscionability, public equivocating notwith-
vouching in those vexed and complex topics. On the niceties of commercial "duress,"
see WoowADu, THE LAW OF QUAsI-CoNTRACTS §§211-18 (1913); Dalzell, Duress
by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REV. 237, 341 (1942) ; Dawson, Economic Duress
and the Fair Exchange in French and Gerian Law, 11 Tui. L. REV. 345, 12 id. 42
(1937); Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MIcH. L. REV. 253
(1947); Annot, 79 A.L.R. 655 (1932); Note, 15 N.C.L. REV. 412 (1937). Cf. Note,
20 CoLuJm. L. Rxv. 80 (1920) (threat of litigation).
Somewhat peripheral for our purposes, but of great interest on the general
problem of duress and quasi-duress in a contract context, are Hale's two articles,
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLum. L. REV. 603 (1943);
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Scr. Q.
470 (1923), with their careful discussion of the difficulties that arise from the fact
that every market exchange depends upon some kind of "coercion.! See especially
43 CoLum. L. REv. at 612-13; 38 POL. Scr. Q. at 478.
50 See, for instance, the position of Bernard D. Broeker, who was a member of
the subcommittees of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute, which considered the work on article 2 of
the Code "leading to the 1958 Edition," UCC, comment to Title, at 8, and who
remains at present a member of that subcommittee of the Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code created to deal with possible changes in that
article, id. at viii. At the meeting of the Larger Editorial Board of the American
Law Institute on January 28, 1951, Mr. Broeker said (with respect to the 1950
version of § 2-302) :
I think that is a tremendous expansion of the law, and I don't think it
ought to be that. I see no reason why I should not be allowed to make an
unconscionable contract.
Proceedings of the Larger Editorial Board of the American Law Institute, January
27-28, 1951, at 172, partially'reprihted in 6 Bus.-LAw. 164, 184-85 (1951).
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standing. The first clue is the express limitation of the unconscion-
ability section to "form" contracts until 1948.51 The second clue, which
reinforces the first, is found by a study of the procedural unconscion-
ability aspects of the ten cases which were inserted in the official
comments to 2-302 in the 1950 draft, 2 described then (and now) as
illustrating "the underlying basis" of the section,5" and frequently
pointed to by commentators in an effort to rebut any suggestion that
the meaning of the unconscionability section is not clear.5 As might
have been expected, all ten of the cases involve commercial contracting
situations. But they are notably common commercial situations. One
finds none of the dramatics to be encountered in the equity unconscion-
ability cases; " the parties are not notably old or young, bright or
stupid, drunk, needy or sick. None of the cases involves sailors,
women, heirs or other presumptive incompetents. There is no flavor
of fraud or duress in any individualistic sense. Nothing more seems
to have happened in any of these cases (except one) than that the
parties entered into a contract on a pre-prepared form supplied by
one of them. 6
But one might have expected that more would have been dis-
closed about the contract-procuring procedure in these cases than merely
that they involved form contracts. Unless all form contracts are to
be deemed open to subsequent judicial rewriting under the unconscion-
ability section, the cases illustrating the section's "underlying basis"
should have given some indication of what, in addition to being
printed, would make a contract vulnerable. When one examines the
ten cases carefully, however, to see how many of them involved such
factors, one finds, for instance, that less than half of them are merchant-
consumer cases (though these would seem to furnish the best context
for overreaching), the remainder being merchant-merchant trans-
51 See 1948 DRAFt § 2-302.
52 See 1950 DRAFt § 2-302, comment 1.
See UCC § 2-302, comment 1. There has been absolutely no change in this
portion of the comment from 1950 to date.
4 See, e.g., HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1.1603, at 47-48 (1964); Davenport, The Nebraska Uniform Commercial
Code: An Introduction and Articles 1 and 2, 43 NEB. L. REv. 671, 702 n.165 (1964) ;
Lattin, Article 2: Sales, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 189 n.25 (1962). But cf. Note, 45
IowA L. REv. 843, 849 (1960), suggesting that the official-comment cases are not
quite on point.
55 See text accompanying notes 185-202 infra.
56 The clear exception is Austin Co. v. Tillman Co., 104 Ore. 541, 209 Pac. 131
(1922), where the governing contract was a letter composed for the occasion, by
the party who ultimately successfully challenged its terms no less. The contracts
in Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73
P.2d 1272 (1937), Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks, 100 Kan. 376, 164 Pac. 273
(1917), and Robert A. Monroe & Co. v. Meyer, [1930] 2 K.B. 312, -were uncom-
plicated enough to. have .been constructed for. the particular transaction, but, although
the cases are not explicit, it is more likely that they were printed forms.
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actions.57  Moreover, in none of the cases (except one) " does the
court suggest that the form used in the transaction was particularly
complicated, involved or extensive; these do not appear to be the
kinds of forms that fight from ambush in a thicket of small print. Nor
do the cases serve particularly to illustrate any monopolistic or
oligopolistic power. Two of the cases " do indeed involve motor-
vehicle warranty disclaimers of the kind eventually declared against
public policy in Henizingsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,"0 and another
case 6 did involve a transaction between an automobile dealer and his
supplier, a relationship replete with business-duress possibilities,' but
that is as far as things go in this line.3 These ten cases, then, are not
a particularly good selection if they were chosen to illustrate varieties
of commercial rapacity. These are, for the most part, simple form-
contract cases, with no especially striking admixtures of quasi-fraud
("unfair surprise") or quasi-duress ("oppression"). It is incon-
ceivable, therefore, that the cases are designed to establish a picture of
what kinds of bargaining will cause the voiding of a contract or a
clause therein. At best they may be taken to illustrate what kind of
bargaining procedure will not serve to insulate a contract from gutting
pursuant to 2-302 if it turns out to be substantively unconscionable.
This is quite different from describing what bargaining conduct will
57Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327
(1928), Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927), and Meyer v.
Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922), are clear.
In addition, the discontented seller in Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks, 100 Kan. 376,
164 Pac. 273 (1917), was apparently a farmer and one may include him among the
nonmerchants even though it is arguable that a farmer selling his produce is a
"merchant" under UCC § 2-104. See Corman, The Law of Sales Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 17 RurGERs L. REV. 14, 17 (1962). But see 65 MicH. L. Rev.
345 (1966).
UsNew Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 438-39, 189 N.W.
815, 824 (1922): "if it be a contract, it is like the Apostle's conception of the human
frame, 'fearfully and wonderfully made .... "' This is a merchant-to-merchant
case, by the way.
59 Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327
(1928); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216'N.W. 790 (1927).
60 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
6 1 Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., [1934] 1 K.B. 17 (C.A.).
02See Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957) ; Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between
a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their
Dealers, and the Legal System, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 483, 740. It is worth noting that
a statute now to some extent regulates the manufacturers' alleged gross power to
overreach. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
I am assuming, just to state the case as strongly as possible, that the English
automobile company in 1933 had as strong a stranglehold on its dealers as the Ameri-
can big four allegedly had on their dealers in the 1950's, but I would be exceedingly
surprised if that were anything like the truth.
63 For completeness one might include Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks, 100 Kan.
376, 164 Pac. 273 (1917), as a case where there might have been no real choice.
I certainly do not know the state of Kansas wheat marketing in 1917, but I can
conceive 6f an our-mill-or-none choice for a local farner.. There is no talk in thq
opinion of such a state of affairs, hdwever,
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void a contract; if these cases show the way, any form contract is up
for grabs under 2-302.
The frank adoption of the position that any form contract was
open to clause-by-clause policing, however, as Professor Llewellyn
pointed out very early in the game, leaves this problem: the use of
form contracts is a social good; it is the contracting-process component
of the mass transaction, and the mass sales transaction has exceeding
economic utility.' The form contract is designed not to be read or
pondered; if it is or has to be it loses much of its utility. But not
reading it leads to attempts at aggrandizement by form. 5 The law's
problem, therefore, is to discourage dickering and overreaching simul-
taneously. For this it needs some new device, since in theory at least,
until the time of the mass form, it was the dickering which discouraged
the overreaching. If this new device, however, is making all printed
forms open to after-the-fact ad hoc judicial second guessing, there is
the danger that the efficiency of mass transactions will be seriously
impaired. Moreover, once one faces the fact that the "vice" in the
contracting process is nothing more than the use of a form contract, the
internal justification for interfering with the parties' transaction be-
comes attenuated. It becomes exceedingly harder to justify suspension
of the ordinary rule that a sui juris person who signs his name is bound
to what is over his signature. After all, preprinting one's contracts
is hardly malum in se.
This tension seems to have led some commentators on 2-302 to
suggest that the contracting-procedure element which will permit
scrutiny for unconscionability is not the mere use of a form but the
use of a form plus something else. That is, they have felt impelled to
find some "vice" to justify the judicial meddling." And they have
identified this form-plus situation with the "contract of adhesion," 67 a
64 Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 701 (1939).
6 See MimEo 1941 DRAFT § 1-C, comment A(2) : "A private codification, however,
has dangers. It may heap all the advantages sought on one side, and heap all the
burdens on the other."
IN See, e.g., 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GuIDE TO THE UNIFORm Com-
MERCIAL CODE § 1.1602 (1964); Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16
LAw & CONTm P. PROB. 3, 19 n.78 (1951).
67The term "contract of adhesion" most likely comes from Saleilles, who speaks
of contracts:
dans lesquels il y a la pr~dominance exclusive d'une seule volunt , agissant
comme volunte unilat6rale, qui dicte sa loi, non plus i un individu, mais i
une collectivit6 ind~termin~e, et qui s'engage dijA par avance, unilat&ralement,
sauf adhesion de ceux qui voudrant accepter la loi du contrat, et s'emparer
de cet engagement dejA cr~e sur soi-meme.
SALEILLES, DE LA DPCLARATION DE VOLUNTA § 89, at 229-30 (1901).
Professor Patterson's translation of this passage is:
in which a single will is exclusively predominant, acting as a unilateral will
which dictates its law, no longer to an individual, but to an indeterminate
collectivity, and which in advance undertakes unilaterally, subject to the
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contract to which one of the parties must either "adhere" entirely or
refuse altogether. In such a contract, a party may not bargain minutely
over form or content, but must take it as is, if at all.6" In some cases
(for instance transactions with regulated utilities) a party may not
even be able to bargain over price. 9 The essence of the adhesion
contract is not its "formishness" " (that is just a symptom), but the
fact that one of the parties has, at least for the purposes of the trans-
action in question, some of the powers of a monopolist. This "monop-
olistic power" need not be that wielded by a "true" monopolist, legal or
other. It may be. One cannot bargain, especially over the price, with
the telephone company, or with one's local airline. But that is not a
requisite of the adhesion contract. In some cases the "monopoly"
power may be only in a certain locality, when the purchaser is not
mobile enough to get another seller who will offer other terms.71  In
some cases the monopoly power is really an expression of oligopoly
power, e.g., contract forms containing identical clauses written by
competitors who nevertheless together blanket the market.7' How it
adhesion of those who would wish to accept the law [loi] of the contract and
to take advantage of the engagements imposed on themselves.
Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 833,
856 (1964). He goes on to theorize that the term contract of adhesion "may have
been derived from the analogy of multilateral treaties, which are drawn up by nego-
tiations between a few nations who sign and invite other nations to adhere to the
treaty later." Id. at 856 n.96.
08 The adhesion contract idea has had a long history of learned commentary,
much of it of extremely high quality. See (in chronological order) Isaacs, The
Standardization of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917) (Karl Llewellyn was an editor
of 27 YALE L.J.); PRAUsNrrz, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937), reviewed by Llewellyn, 52 HARv. L.
REv. 700 (1939) ; Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUm. L. R-v. 629 (1943) ; Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws, 53 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1072 (1953) ; Sales, Standard Form Contracts,
16 MODERN L. Rxv. 318 (1953); Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom
of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36
Ttu.. L. REv. 481 (1962) ; Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Funda-
mental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964); Wilson, Freedom of Contract and
Adhesion Contracts, 14 IXT'L & Coup. L.Q. 172 (1965).
09 See, e.g., 24 Stat. 384 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (railroad
rates); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 392.240 (1952) (telephone rates).
701 am not sure whether the word "adhesion" has similar connotations in the
original French, but it should not be overlooked that in English, perhaps because of
the ubiquitous "adhesive tape," the word has strong connotations of agglutination
and stickiness. This leads, I think, to an often subliminal impulse on the part of
English-speaking commentators to speak of adhesion contracts as if they are not
only quasi-monopolistic, but as if they are the kind that always contain a great many
provisions stuck closely together. See, e.g., 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128, at 552 (1963)
("long printed standardized contracts").
71 It is of course a truism that there are geographic "relevant markets" within
which a relatively small operator may function as a monopolist. But it should also
be noted that the "market" sometimes is subjectively more narrow than that. For
instance, consumers who are ignorant may think their local furniture stores are their
only market, and this may give effective adhesion-contract power to the stores which
they do not in fact have. Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), discussed at text accompanying notes 267-99 infra.
72 Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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comes about is less important than the fact that it exists; the hallmark
of the adhesion contract, and its alleged evil, is that the purveyor of
such a contract is in the position for one reason or another to refuse
to bargain, to put the other party to a take-it-or-leave-it option.
The dramatic situation which typically frames the contract of
adhesion, therefore, is the merchant-consumer retail sale. But while
it is very hard to imagine many adhesion contracts which are not at
the same time form contracts, it is very simple to imagine form con-
tracts which are not contracts of adhesion. In fact, there is one species
of contract, one which most likely accounts for the bulk of commercial
contracting in the nation, which is ordinarily a form contract but not
an adhesion contract-the merchant-to-merchant form-pad contract, the
subject matter of the "battle of the forms." " These form-pad deals
may on occasion be adhesion deals too, but they certainly need not be.
Indeed, there is often a sharp gulf between the typical contract of
adhesion and the typical businessmen's battle of the forms. In a very
large number of cases businessmen dealing with each other are not
forced to take or leave each other's forms. They do not have so limited
a market (or knowledge) that they cannot deal elsewhere, and they
can, if they wish, argue about even the minutiae of the transaction.74
As a general rule, however, they do not so wish. They prefer instead
to maneuver like Renaissance condottieri for the cheap and bloodless
positional victory that comes with the "making" of the contract on
their own form. They acquiesce if they lose (if indeed they notice
losing as such at all), seemingly because they just don't care. Ad-
mittedly a man does not make a contract expecting to get nothing.
But he may very well enter a contract by which he assumes the risk
of getting nothing. Professor Llewellyn with his customary insight
noted that businessmen don't read contracts because they always expect
to get the "something" they were dealing for. But he also stated as a
fact that businessmen also expect to have subsidiary terms which are
"fair," or at least "not manifestly unfair." " Let me submit an
alternative possibility: most businessmen, insofar as they think about
the question at all, expect that the other party's form will be the same
7 See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 362-71 (1960). It may be
seen in operation in Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962).
74 This is not to suggest that businessmen cannot be put into the position of
adherers given proper leverage on the part of another businessman, as for instance
may have occurred between automobile manufacturers and their dealers. See Kessler,
supra note 62; Macaulay, supra note 62.
75 See, e.g., MIMEO 1941 DRAFT § l-C(1) (d) and comment A(3); LLEWELLYN,
op. cit. supra note 73, at 370 (1960) ("any not unreasonable or indecent terms");
Llewellyn, Common Law Reform of Consideration; Are There Measures, 41 COLUm.
L. REv. 863, 871 (1941) ("too far unbalanced"); 21 AmanucAN LAW IirsTiT TE
PaocEaD nns 114 (1944) ("a cake sliced 99-1").
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kind of form which they had their lawyers draft -for them, that is, a
form which attempts to take everything for the owner of the pad.
Does a man's own form have a warranty disclaimer? Yes. Does he
expect to find one in the forms of his suppliers? You bet your life.
Does he expect, therefore, that he will not receive the goods he ordered,
of roughly the quality ordered? Absolutely not. He expects his
supplier to deliver as per the order, just as he would expect to do to
his customers, but he also expects that his supplier will have so
drafted his form that it will be almost impossible to get legal recom-
pense 76 if the buyer and seller disagree over the quality.
Professor Llewellyn may merely have known nicer businessmen
than I. Perhaps his position is right as a matter of descriptive psy-
chology. I suspect, however, that his "description" is really the pre-
scription: businessmen ought not to try to take everything. That may
well be true, but the evil is taking everything, not doing so by the
presentation of a preprinted form contract. Insofar as anyone's justi-
fication for the utilization of a judicial-rewriting provision like 2-302
rests on the "evil" of the bargaining process, it is shattered if that evil
consists only in prefabrication of the form itself; after all, the com-
plaining party could have read it and if he had read it he could have
argued about it. He didn't. It is at least arguable without a blush
that such situations are to be treated in a fashion different from the
treatment accorded true adhesion contracts 77 or even the standard
quasi-monopolist consumer transaction.
But no distinction was made in 2-302 between merchant-to-
merchant and merchant-to-consumer cases 71 (though the "merchant"
definition was already made 79). In addition, at least some of the
commentary about various versions indicated that indeed the business-
man's form pad was the target of the section, and it has certainly been
a common assumption that none of the additional elements which
76 Most of all, the businessman expects to settle things out of court and out of
a law context. See Jones, Merchants, the Law Merchant, and Recent Missouri Sales
Cases: Some Reflections, 1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 397, 411-18.
77For instance, (1) promulgating standard contract terms, see N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 155 (life insurance) ; Sales, Standard Formo Contracts, 16 MODERN L. REv. 318,
340-42 (1953); Lenhoff, Optional Terms (Jus Dispositivum) aid Required. Terms
(Jus Cogens) in the Law of Contracts, 45 MicH. L. REV. 39 (1946), and (2) setting
up special tribunals to pass on form contracts in advance. See Gottschalk, The Israeli
Law of Standard Contracts, 1964, 81 L.Q. REv. 31 (1965); Note, 66 COLUu. L. REv.
1340 (1966).
78 It is interesting to remember that once upon a time there was a special rule
for merchants' negotiations written into what was to become § 2-302. In 1943 DRp-r
§ 24 it was provided that if a merchant had an opportunity to read a contract, he ivas
bound, even if he had not read it (the rule being otherwise for non-merchants). That
provision was eliminated in MAY 1944 DRAFrn § 23, never to .reappear.
7 See UCC §2-104(1).
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transmute a form contract into the somewhat more objectionable ad-
hesion contract are prerequisite to the use of 2-302.' Thus, the use
of the adhesion-contract learning is useful only insofar as it permits one
to take the cachet and tone of the consumer-oppression cases and
transfer it wholesale to 2-302. This enables one to feel that by using
the section he is punishing naughty contracting conduct, without having
to focus sharply on the fact that the level of conduct actually subject
to 2-302 is hardly more than printing up one's contracts in advance.
Let us assume, however, that despite the references to the business-
man's form-pad deal, the procedural unconscionability component of
section 2-302 is at the adhesion-contract level rather than at the mere
form-contract level; that is, that something more than mere preprinting
must be shown before the resultant contract becomes subject to med-
dling under 2-302. It is exceedingly important to note that the only
thing such a determination does is to set the level of contract-insulating
conduct. One may now argue that a contract which has a sufficient
number of indicia of compulsion to be fairly described as a contract
of adhesion is not something upon which a party can rely to protect
the provisions therein from the Code's unconscionability section. In
other words, the adhesion contract becomes an exception to the usual
rule that one is bound to that which he signs."' But that cannot mean
that all contracts of adhesion are void, or that all clauses contained in
contracts of adhesion are going to be stricken under 2-302. The
presentation of an adhesion contract to a person is not, like the
presentation of a pistol to his head, sufficient, if proven, to prevent
the enforcement of the contract no matter how "fair" its terms.82 The
provisions of the telephone company tariffs and of the common carrier's
tickets are ordinarily binding; one cannot get out from under a provision
of that sort by showing only that one could not have bargained about
it. Thus, once it is decided that a certain contract is vulnerable to
scrutiny under 2-302 because its bargaining was not sufficiently angelic
to insulate it from the section, the problem of the unconscionability
provision of the Code still remains unsolved: granted that the contract
is now open to 2-302, when is it, or a portion of it, "unconscionable"?
80 See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 73, at 362-71; Llewellyn, supra note
75, at 869-70; Project, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1087, 1132 (1963); Note, 18 U. CL L.
REv. 146, 146-47 (1950).
81 RESTATEMENT, CoNrRACTS § 70 (1932). RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1964) seems not to change this "usual rule." Where old
§ 70 ought to be there is instead a reference to §§ 20-23. Of these, § 21(3) seems
the most relevant, providing in effect that an only apparent assent may still be an
assent, but that the resulting contract may be voidable because of "fraud, duress,
mistake or other invalidating cause."
32 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 494-95 (1932). The same is true of fraud.
See id. §§ 475-77.
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SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY
Drafting History
That the clause "or a portion of it" is necessary in the last
sentence is particularly important for understanding the root failure
of 2-302. For at least as originally conceived, substantive unconscion-
ability meant something like "gross overall imbalance" of an entire
contract. The section was viewed as governing unconscionable con-
tracts, or at least large bloc segments of contracts drafted in gross. The
determination invited by the section seems to have been almost quanti-
tative. In the 1941 version of 2-302 and its extraordinarily extensive
explanatory materials,83 the metaphors of weighing and balancing
abounded. The section described the act of which it was a part 8 4 as
representing "a fair and balanced allocation of rights and liabilities
between parties to sales and contracts to sell." s' While "policy in
general requires the parties' particular bargain to control," said the
section,"' and while "speed and convenience in transacting business may
require . . . extensive departures [from the act's provisions] to be
incorporated .... " 87
on the other hand, . . .where a group or bloc of provisions
are not studied and bargained about in detail by both parties,
then actual assent . . . is not in fact to be assumed where
the group or bloc of provisions, taken as a whole, allocates
rights and obligations in an unreasonably unfair and un-
balanced fashion.'
The policy of the legislature is also to avoid any unseeming
portion of a bargain . . . under which one party seeks to
displace the rules of this Act . . . in favor of a set of pro-
visions which lack reasonable balance and fairness in their
allocation of rights and obligations.'
When a number of matters are purportedly covered en bloc "as by a
form contract," o the court may examine the bloc of provisions to see
if it works a modification of the act's provisions "in an unfair and
unbalanced fashion." 91 If, however, "the bloc as a whole is shown
8 3 MIrmo 1941 DRAr § 1-C. See note 13 upra for a description of the peculiarly
discursive form of this original provision.
84At that time, the "Revised Uniform Sales Act" See Mimo 1941 DRAFT
title page.
85 MiuEo 1941 DRAFr § 1-C(1) (a).
86 MIiEO 1941 DRAFT § 1-C(1) (b).
8 MfMEzo 1941 DRAFT §1-C(1) (c).
8 8 MIMEo 1941 DRa §-C(1) (d).
89 MrmEo 1941 Dir § 1-C(1) (e).
9o Mmo 1941 DRAFr § 1-C(2) (a).
91 MI mEo 1941 DAFT § 1-C(2) (a) (i).
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affirmatively to work a fair and balanced allocation" it is not to be
modified or stricken. 2  In addition, in "weighing fair balance" the
court is directed "properly [to] consider the circumstances of prepara-
tion of any contract form . . . and, in particular . . . (ii) whether the
displacement of the provisions of this Act sought by the form . . .
as a whole runs disproportionately in favor of one party as against
the other." "
This weighing-balancing, quasi-quantified outlook suggested by
both the denotation and the metaphoric content of the statute is made
even more explicit in the accompanying commentary:
The true principle is clear enough: the expression of a
body of fair and balanced usage is a great convenience, a gain
in clarity and certainty, an overcoming of the difficulty faced
by the law in regulating the multitude of different trades; on
the other hand, the substitution of private rule-making by one
party, in his own interest, for the balance provided by the
law, is not to be recognized without strong reason shown."
Or again:
Question for the court. The total estimate of the effect
of a body of provisions, in terms of balance, is a job for
which a court is peculiarly fitted. The question of whether
the provisions fit the circumstances of a particular trade is
one which a special merchants' jury can best judge .
But the merchant runs some risk of accepting a provision
merely as it is written because it is so written; and he has
little training in sizing up a transaction from both ends at
once, to reach a view of balance. As against this stands the
fact that the issue to be tried is the issue of balance; and given
that focus of attention, the merchant's jury would seem an
adequate tribunal. 5
Finally, the philosophical background of this decision to make the
focus of the section the "imbalance" of the contract, was spelled out in
the "Report" which accompanied the draft." Under the heading, "The
Problem of a Semi-Permanent Code of a Whole Field," the Report
suggested that a Code could provide two kinds of statutory frameworks.
The first kind (the example given was the Statute of Frauds) is "iron
and unyielding; the parties must adapt themselves to it whether they
will or no." But
92 MIMEO 1941 DRAFT § 1-C(2) (a) (ii).
93 MImEo 1941 DRAFT § 1-C(2) (c).
9 4 MIMEO 1941 DRAFT § 1-C, comment A(5), at 19.
9 5 MIMEo 1941 DRAFT § I-C, comment B (2). (Emphasis in original.) MIMao
1941 DRAy § 51-C made provision for the empanelling of a merchant's jury.
96 See note 13 supra.
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the second kind of framework is a sort of standardized
contract, serving wherever the parties have not particularized
their bargain. It fills in and it fills out. Its office is to pro-
vide not only reasonable and fair solutions for particular
matters, but, no less, a whole background of solutions for
any matter, which as a whole is sufficiently reasonable and
fair not to need to be bargained about.9 7
But, the Report goes on, variations from this "fair and balanced"
background must be permitted if the admitted utility of form contracting
is to be available at all under the statute. What then? Well, what the
Report says about this balancing act so exposes the kernel of the problem
that it bears full quotation:
Balance in any background sought to be substituted.
The Draft proceeds upon the assumption-in-policy that
buyers and sellers ought (within the limits of such rules as
those on legality) to be free to bargain as they choose. It
proceeds upon the assumption-in-fact that choosing to bargain
means resorting to deliberate and intentional dicker about
particular terms, producing the kind of transaction known in
law as an effective contract. Deliberate and intentional
dickering is not shown in fact by a series of printed, unread
clauses. -When such a series appears, the position of the
Draft is that the reasonableness of assuming both parties to
have chosen and agreed to incorporate such a set of clauses,
in silence and without dickering, depends upon whether the
series of clauses presents the kind of balanced background
which parties can fairly, or indeed accurately, be thought to
incorporate by silence."'
This is developed in the comment to the withdrawn section 1-C.
This passage is not only important for a study of this draft's position
on procedural unconscionability, but it serves also to clarify the picture
of the substantively unconscionable as viewed by the draftsman. "Im-
balance," it seems clear, was not viewed only as evidence that some
validating bargaining standard had not been met, but was also in itself
that which was offensive ("unconscionable") in the resulting contract.
Put another way, overall imbalance in the 1941 draft was not only
evidence (perhaps proof) of procedural unconscionability; at the same
time it was substantive unconscionability.
The 1941 draft, then, its comments and accompanying "Report,"
with their complete focus upon overall imbalance, must have contem-
9 7
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PRO-
POSED REPORT ON AND DRApFT OF A REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 22-23 (1941).
(Emphasis in original.)
98 Id. at 24. (Emphasis in original.)
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plated as the field of operation of 2-302 the entire contract, or at
least a major group of provisions within the contract.' "Imbalance"
is, to put things mildly, a singularly inartistic way to refer to what
might be objectionable about a single contractual provision.' And
indeed, after this first version of the unconscionability section was with-
drawn from consideration as "unworkable," ""' the provision which
replaced it made even more explicit that the unconscionability decision
was to be made with respect to the whole contract. The new section
read as follows:
SECTION 24. FORM CLAUSES, CONSCIONABLE AND UNCON-
SCIONABLE.
(1) A party who signs or accepts a writing evidencing
a contract for sale which contains or incorporates one or
more form clauses presented by the other party is bound by
them unless the writing when read in its entirety including
the form clauses is an unconscionable contract .... 102
The accompanying comment " 3 made it even more abundantly clear
that the vice still being attacked was lack of overall contractual balance.
Referring to form-pad transactions, the comment stated that "such
forms when drawn with elaborate lopsidedness can become what are
in essence instruments of trickery." 104 And with regard to what the
final official comment should say, the unofficial comment suggested:
The Comment should show that since the rules of the
Act are drawn with a careful balance of the rights and needs
of buyer and seller, a form which cumulates too many de-
partures from those rules in material particulars, and in favor
of one side only, begins to take on the aspect of the uncon-
scionable." 5
99 While I think that the truth of this conclusion is established beyond cavil, it
should be pointed out that the heading to § 1-C read, "Declaration of Policy and
Procedure with Regard to Displacement of Single Provisions or Groups of Pro-
visions by Agreement."
1o It is of course possible that in some circumstances a single provision of an
entire contract might be so outrageous as to render the whole radically unbalanced.
For instance, if no duties are given one of the parties, even at common law this
absolute imbalance prevented enforcement under the rubric "illusory contract." See
1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 145 (1963). A too enthusiastic limitation-of-remedy clause
might have a similar effect under the Code. Cf. UCC § 2-719(2).
101 See note 21 supra.
102 1943 DRA-'r § 24. (Emphasis added.)
103 [Llewellyn,] Informal Appendix To Revised Uniform Sales Act, Third Draft,
1943, Tentative Sketch of Material for Comments (1943).
104 Id. at 11. (Emphasis added.)
105 Id. at 12.
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This idea, that "unconscionability" meant something like overall
contractual imbalance, was maintained all the way up to the 1948
version of section 2-302.1"6 At that point came a change of immense
significance. The 1948 version read in its entirety as follows:
SECTION 23. UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR CLAUSE.
(1) If the court finds the contract to be unconscionable,
it may refuse to enforce the contract or strike any uncon-
scionable clauses and enforce the rest of the contract or
substitute for the stricken clause such provision as would be
implied under this Act if the stricken clause had never existed.
(2) A contract not unconscionable in its entirety but
containing an unconscionable clause, whether a form clause
or not, may be enforced with any such clause stricken.
This draft says bluntly that a court may excise from a not unconscion-
able contract any single "unconscionable" clause, and the comment
accompanying the 1949 version (in which version the text of the section
itself is not changed from the 1948 draft) says it just as bluntly:
Under this section the court, in its discretion, may refuse to
enforce the contract as a whole if it is permeated by the
unconscionability or it may strike any single clause or group
of clauses which are so tainted or which are contrary to the
essential purpose of the agreement." 7
From this point on in the drafting history of section 2-302 the concept
of single-clause unconscionability was fixed; no substantial changes
were made in this regard in the text of the statute or its accompanying
comments."3 The current comment 2 109 was present in essentially its
final form as early as the 1950 draft."0
This progression through the drafts of the idea of substantive un-
conscionability, from overall imbalance to one-clause naughtiness, is
the most important single transformation disclosed by a study of the
drafting history. Determining which contracts are substantively un-
conscionable is a difficult enough job even if one's conception of sub-
stantive unconscionability is something like "gross imbalance" or
10031948 DRAFr §23.
107 1949 DRAFr § 2-302, comment 1. There were no comments accompanying
1948 DRAFT.
108 See note 39 mspra.
109 2. Under this section the court, in its discretion, may refuse to enforce
the contract as a whole if it is permeated by the unconscionability, or it may
strike any single clause or group of clauses which are so tainted or which
are contrary to the essential purpose of the agreement, or it may simply
limit unconscionable clauses so as to avoid unconscionable results.
UCC § 2-302, comment 2.
110 Compare 1950 DAFr § 2-302, comment 2.
514 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"lopsidedness." After all, even a lopsided contract might in some cases
be hard to identify; what if X got seven risks and Y got five--or four
to three-or two to one? The spuriousness of the quantification lurk-
ing in the idea of a contract suffering from "overall imbalance" is a
potential plague for close cases. Compared, however, with the diffi-
culties of dealing with a concept of one-clause unconscionability, it is
pure vanilla. It is not a rare rule in the law that he who bites off
much more than he should will be judicially choked. The treatment of
over-enthusiastic no-competition clauses"-' and trade-secret protection
provisions"' are common examples. Quantification, while falsifying
if it gives the impression of numerical precision, at least carries with
it a metaphorical framework which is an aid to the decision of all but
the closest cases. A real scale is admittedly useless for the measurement
of anything but physical weight, but a scale as a metaphor at least lets
one know that he is looking for too much of something. Admittedly,
the precision of the result depends upon what is being "weighed." If
it is something like potatoes which arbitrarily have a "weight," then
the measure of weight in those terms is exact, but if it is a quality not
attracted by gravity which is "weighed," then the weighing and balanc-
ing are not going to be more than metaphorically precise. Risks, for
instance, do not have calibratable weight. Once it is established, how-
ever, that one is looking for a comparison of risks, if what is involved
is a contract which gives no risks at all to one of the parties, or almost
none, the decision under the metaphor is easy. And it was this sort
of contract which seems to have been the intended target of the original
draftsman's original draft." 3 For that "almost-all" kind of contract
111 See, e.g., Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d
245 (1963), for a recent decision, the four-to-three nature of which is eloquent on
how hard these determinations can be. See also Vaughan v. Kizer, 400 S.W.2d 586,
589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (reasonableness of restrictions as "questions of law for
determination by the court") ; Brown v. Devine, - Ark. -, 402 S.W.2d 669 (1966)
(must strike whole contract; "modifying" not within court's power).
112 See Note, Protection of Inventive Ideas Through Postemployment Assign-
ment Covenants, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 335, 359.
113 See text accompanying notes 83-98 supra.
Of course, nothing as difficult as this question is ever that easy for a draftsman
like Llewellyn. In 1944 he told the American Law Institute:
I think that everybody who signs up on such a form knows perfectly well
that he is signing a contract drawn to some extent in favor of the other party
and against him, and he is perfectly willing to take a cake sliced 60-40 or
perhaps even 75-25. But when it gets to be a cake sliced 99-1, he doesn't
find that that is what he was agreeing to tacitly.
21 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 114 (1944). Ten years later (and, it
should be noted, after the central concept of the section had switched to one-clause
unconscionability), his metaphor was still going strong (with only slight gustatory
variation) ; it was then "80% of the pie." NEW YORK LAW REVIsION COMM'N, STUDY
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 113 (Legis. Doc. No. 65(B), 1954). On the
other hand he was also sometimes plagued by a feeling that certain individual clauses
were just no good, no matter how well bargained, e.g., no-oral-waiver clauses (other
than between merchants). Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform of Consideration: Are
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ordinarily involved in a form contract, and a fortiori in an unregulated
contract of adhesion, this rough quantitative approach seems to have
been roughly sufficient.
The overall-imbalance formulation, however, cannot settle all of
the heart stirrings which may be caused by harsh results. If all of
the risks of a particular contract are put upon A, except for one which
is put upon B, and it is the risk which B was to bear which in fact
occurs, B loses. Under the overall-imbalance rubric how does one
deal, for instance, with an ordinary old contract with no radical clauses
of any kind, which, nevertheless, contains a clause clearly disclaiming
any warranty? The problem may be stated quite simply: with respect
to the effect of any particular contract upon any actual party thereto,
most of the contract is irrelevant. Ordinarily only one shifted risk
comes home to roost, and if there were fifty others shifted, their
potential is never actualized. That means that a refusal to enforce a
contract in any particular case would not be a response to what hap-
pened in that case (which would have happened anyway had only the
one risk which came true been shifted), but would be instead a response
to general naughtiness on the part of the party who procured such a
tough contract.'14
On the other hand, if one decides to police contracts on a clause-
by-clause basis, he finds that he has merely substituted the highly
abstract word "unconscionable" for the possibility of more concrete and
particularized thinking about particular problems of social policy.
Should warranty disclaimers be permitted? If so, should they be with
respect to consumer goods? 115 Should parties be allowed to agree
about what law will govern their contract? :16 To what extent, if any,
should a party be permitted to limit his liability under a contract? All
of these questions need decision." 7 But not one of them is helped
There Measures?, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 863, 869 (1941). And even his latest writings
show that the existence of an important one-clause-whole-contract distinction was
not totally appreciated. See LLEWELLYN, THE ConmoN LAW TRADrrIox 371 (1960)
(contract terms should be unfair "neither in the particular nor in the net!').
114 An instance of this peculiar type of decision is Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,
172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948), where the defendant willfully broke an unfavorable contract
but the plaintiff was denied specific performance because of the alleged nastiness of
certain provisions in the form contract he drafted, even though they had nothing to
do with the defendant's breach or impending loss.
115 See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 1019 (1966), for just such more
concretized thinking.
116 See the exchange between Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial
Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 350-52 (1952), and Gilmore, The
Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 373-74(1952).117And they all do get some kind of particularized decision in the Code. UCC
§2-316 is on exclusion of warranty, § 1-105 is on choice of law and § 2-719 is on
limitation of remedy. It is in fact hard to imagine which kinds of clauses reasonably
expectable in a commercial contract might be unconscionable but have not been regu-
lated by more specific portions of the Code.
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toward solution by being subsumed in a section as a species of "un-
conscionability." The word "unconscionable," as finally used in the
Code, describes neither the dramatic situation of two persons bargain-
ing nor the "imbalance" or "lopsidedness" or other quality of the re-
sulting contract, but rather describes the emotional state of the trier
which will justify his use of the section. In other words, the attitudes
relevant under section 2-302 are not those of the parties but those of
the judges. The pictures to be sought in the facts are not of the
varieties of oppressive or surprising negotiations, nor of oppressive or
surprising contracts, but rather of oppressed or surprised judges. But
what may permissibly make the judges' pulses race or their cheeks
redden, so as to justify the destruction of a particular provision, is,
one would suppose, what the judge ought to have been told by the
statute. In short, once the movement was made to a conception of
one-clause unconscionability, and the "overall-imbalance" rubric was
abandoned as insufficient, the statute and its commentary had been
stripped of any power to guide the decision of what the "bad" single
provisions might be like. And the enormous significance of this failure
may be illustrated by a careful consideration of the ten cases described
as disclosing the "underlying basis" of the section,"1 and the interesting
way they failed to fill the gap.
The Official-Comment Cases
The ten cases do illustrate the one-clause-unconscionability theory,
each really involving only one offensive "unconscionable" clause. But
there are only two types of naughty clauses represented: warranty dis-
claimers and remedy limitations." 9 Given this arresting fact alone,
one might be tempted to conclude that the purpose of section 2-302 was
to render warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations per se uncon-
scionable. Nor indeed would the world, even the commercial world,
come to an end if parties were forbidden either to disclaim warranties
or to withhold from each other any of the total panoply of remedies
for breach of contract which the Code provides.' In other places in
the Code the draftsmen have felt free flatly to forbid particular con-
tractual provisions, agreement between the parties or not.' 2 '
118 UCC § 2-302, comment 1.
11) The cases appear to be divided about half and half. See HONNOLI, CASES
ON SALES AND SALES FINANCING 27 (2d ed. 1962). In several cases it is hard to
tell if the clause at issue is better classified as a disclaimer of warranty or as a limita-
tion of remedy should a warranty be found to be breached. E.g., Robert A. Munro
& Co. v. Meyer, [1930] 2 K.B. 312, 314 ("the goods to be taken with all faults and
defects; damaged or inferior, if any, at valuation to be arranged mutually or by
arbitration").
120 See UCC §§ 2-702-17.
121 For instance, reducing the limitation period to less than one year is forbidden
by UCC § 2-725(1).
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Unfortunately for the solution of the problem now before us, that
road was not the one taken. It is perfectly clear that under the Code
warranties may be disclaimed, and remedies for breach may be
modified and limited; neither are per se unconscionable. Section 2-316
of the Code is devoted to describing the procedure to be used in dis-
claiming warranties, and section 2-719 is devoted to doing the same
job for remedy limitations. If, therefore, the substantive provisions
of the contracts involved in the ten official-comment cases are to have
any bearing upon the definition of substantive unconscionability, one
must discover if and to what extent those two types of clauses might
comply with their own particularized sections and yet fall afoul of
section 2-302, or find some analogical model which will make the two
provisions descriptive of the kind of provisions being aimed at.
The simpler case of the two is presented by the remedy-limitation
problem. Section 2-719 of the Code provides as follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and
(3) of this section and of the preceding section on liquidation
and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in
addition to or in substitution for those provided
in this Article and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this
Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to
return of the goods and repayment of the price
or to repair and replacement of non-conforming
goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional
unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be ex-
clusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had
as provided in this Act. 2 '
Its first official comment reads:
Purposes:
1. Under this section parties are left free to shape their rem-
edies to their particular requirements and reasonable agree-
ments limiting or modifying remedies are to be given effect.
However, it is of the very essence of a sales contract that
at least minimum adequate remedies be available. If the
parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this
=ucc §§2-719(1), (2).
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Article they must accept the legal consequence that there be
at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations
or duties outlined in the contract. Thus any clause purporting
to modify or limit the remedial provisions of this Article in
an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion and in that
event the remedies made available by this Article are applicable
as if the stricken clause had never existed. Similarly, under
subsection (2), where an apparently fair and reasonable clause
because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to
deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it
must give way to the general remedy provisions of this
Article."4
Now, what is most striking is the extent to which the "evil" with
which this section and its comment are to deal is not left in terms of
high-level abstraction. First, the question of procedural conscionability
is not ambiguously left hanging. The section makes clear that even
if it were proved by the proverbial twenty eavesdropping bishops that
a particular remedy limitation had been haggled over between the
parties, the limitation would have to go if "circumstances" deprived
a party of "the substantial value" of his bargain. No matter what
actual bargaining had led to the remedy-limitation, "at least minimum
adequate remedies" must be provided in the contract.
Thus, the Code reflects a substantive decision on this point. It
did not say that remedies for breach could not be limited to less than
those provided in the Code, but it did provide that remedy for breach
could not be eliminated by agreement. Certainly, section 2-719 did
not settle all of the problems, most particularly what a "minimum
adequate remedy" might be. 24  But it did settle the question to the
extent of providing that no remedy at all was in fact below that requisite
minimum. In other words, the "unchangeable background" view which
animated much of earlier drafts of the Code 125 and Karl Llewellyn's
thinking from a period even before the drafting began,'126 is to some
small extent preserved in section 2-719's attack. Put still another way,
section 2-719 represents a drafting decision that at least one form
of gross overall imbalance will not be permitted. This approach accords
Im UCC § 2-719, comment 1.
124 See Note, Limitations on Freedom To Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YALE
L.J. 723 (1963), for a recent discussion of the general problem.
125 1950 DRAFT § 1-107 provided: "The rules enunciated in this Act which are
not qualified by the words 'unless otherwise agreed' or similar language are mandatory
and may not be waived or modified by agreement." By the 1952 DRAFT that provision
had disappeared and in the current version of the Code the power to modify by agree-
ment has been made explicit. See UCC §§ 1-102(3), (4).
12 6 See, e.g., Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUm.
L. REv. 341, 403-04 (1937).
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with the Code's section dealing with liquidated damages clauses, 1 '
which provides in an orthodox way 128 that too much in the way of
damages for breach is a voidable "penalty." Its comment then added
that, "An unreasonably small amount . . . might be stricken under
the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses." 29 Section 2-719
merely moves the argument one reasonable step further: if one cannot
provide too little in the way of liquidated damages, one cannot provide
too little in the way of modes of recourse either.
The standard provided by section 2-719, therefore, is also a quasi
(or spuriously) quantitative one: is there some remedy provided; if
so, is the remedy "enough"? This is hardly a universal solvent for all
of the problems that might arise in this area. But it is hard to think
of any factual situation in which asking oneself whether a provision
were "unconscionable" would clarify the decision to a problem left un-
solved after asking oneself the much more particularized questions sug-
gested in section 2-719. As benchmarks for determining the permissi-
bility of a remedy limitation, 2-302's "oppression and unfair surprise"
can't hold a candle to 2-719's "fail of its essential purpose," "minimum
adequate remedy," and "fair quantum of remedy." Obviously the
2-719 catchwords don't make close cases easy, but they certainly do
a better job than the single word "unconscionability." It is as if a
single statute contained two provisions, one which forbids the charging
of "excessive" interest and another forbidding "lender naughtiness."
Neither of these sections would be much help in settling what to do
with a 77 % interest charge. But if the interest rate were, say, 78%,
one could handle the problem pretty easily with the excessiveness sec-
tion; it is hard to see what the naughtiness section would add. In
brief, when two sections deal with the same conduct, and one deals
particularistically with reasonably clear standards, and the other deals
with the problem only in terms of emotional coloration, the latter pro-
vision is unlikely to be of any help in solving a problem of specific
application.' 80
12 UCC § 2-718(1).
1
2 8 See 5 CORBIN, CONTRAC£S §§ 1054-75 (1964) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 339
(1932).
129 UCC § 2-718, comment 1.
130 This is put into relief, I think, by what happened to § 2-719 itself when it
ceased to be particularistic. Section 2-719(3) reads as follows:
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limita-
tion or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
The official comment directed to this subsection contains three sentences, one tauto-
logical, one truistic and one mysterious, as follows:
3. Subsection (3) recognizes the validity of clauses limiting or excluding
consequential damages but makes it clear that they may not operate in an
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The mysterious last sentence in the third comment to section
2-719 ... says that the "seller in all cases is free to disclaim warranties
in the manner provided in Section 2-316." 13 If that in fact means
what it seems to, that so long as the procedure set forth in section 2-316
is followed any warranty may be disclaimed, then the significance of
the official-comment cases to an understanding of what might be sub-
stantively unconscionable is even more shadowy. Since the official-
comment cases which do not deal with liability limitations deal instead
with warranty disclaimers, if section 2-302 is inapplicable to warranty
disclaimers too it is hard to see that the contract clauses involved in
the official-comment cases could have much bearing on a definition of
substantive unconscionability.
As I suggested earlier, it would not have been inconceivable for
the draftsmen simply to have declared that some or all of the traditional
implied warranties surrounding sales would be nondisclaimable.'" They
did not do so. The section of the Code explicitly devoted to the
problem of warranty disclaimer is much more a blueprint of disclaiming
technique than an extended form of interdiction. Section 2-316 of
the Code provides (in its relevant portions) as follows:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the
language must mention merchantability and in case of a writ-
ing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied war-
ranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description
on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all
implied warranties are excluded by expressions
unconscionable manner. Actually such terms are merely an allocation of
unknown or undeterminable risks. The seller in all cases is free to disclaim
warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316.
The central difficulty in this provision is that all consequential-damage exclusions
operate in the same manner, and that is a very harsh manner indeed, viz., he who
has suffered a consequential loss does not get compensated for it. Since §2-719
applies to substantively offensive clauses whether bargained about or not, the question
cannot turn on procedural unconscionability considerations. What then does it mean
that something is "prima facie" unconscionable? Is that a statement about the burden
of going forward at a trial, or the burden of persuasion, or both? Or is it just a
quiet way of saying that it is in all cases unconscionable? The awkwardness, I
suspect, is the result of trying to give content to the shibboleth "unconscionable,"
instead of saying flat out what was meant.
131 See note 130 supra.
132 UCC § 2-719, comment 3. (Emphasis added.)
133 Perhaps some provision would have had to have been made for those rare
as-is sales, for instance, jalopies to teenagers, but that could easily have been handled
by a more explicit version of present § 2-316(3) (a).
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like "as is," "with all faults" or other language
which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain that there is no implied war-
ranty; and
(b) [as to patent defects] when the buyer before
entering into the contract has examined the
goods . . . as fully as he desired or has re-
fused to examine the goods . . . and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or
modified by course of dealing or course of per-
formance or usage of trade.'3 4
In case anyone could still doubt the disclaimability of warranties, the
comments accompanying 2-316 provide, inter alia as follows:
1. This section is designed principally to deal with those fre-
quent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude "all
warranties express or implied." It seeks to protect a buyer
from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by
denying effect to such language when inconsistent with lan-
guage of express warranty and permitting the exclusion of
implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other
circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.
3. Disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability is
permitted under subsection (2), but with the safeguard that
such disclaimers must mention merchantability and in case of
a writing be conspicuous.
4. Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded
by general language, but only if it is in writing and
conspicuous.'
Section 2-316, then, not only says that warranties may be dis-
claimed, but it says how one should go about doing so, in rather
impressive detail and with surprising particularity. It is obvious that
184UCC §2-316. Subsection (1) of §2-316 deals with the conflicts between
express warranties and disclaimers, saying that the warranty and the disclaimer "shall
be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other" but that "negation
or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable."
What, if anything, that subsection might mean is, for obvious reasons, the subject
of some dispute. See Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the
California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 310-311 (1961) ; Note,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 564, 581 n.145 (1964). Subsection (4) of §2-316 is a cross-
reference provision pointing to §§ 2-718 and 2-719, liquidation and limitation of dam-
ages sections, respectively. It does not do any pointing to § 2-302.
15 UCC § 2-316, comments 1, 3, 4. See also UCC § 2-315, comment 6 (which
deals with the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose): "The specific
reference forward in the present section . . . is to call attention to the possibility
of eliminating the warranty in any given case."
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the vice is "surprise," and thus even the word "conspicuous" at the
very heart of the provision is not left to speculation. Section 1-201 (10)
of the Code, which defines "conspicuous" generally as "so written that
a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it," goes on thereafter to simplify matters by incorporating a
short typographic manual for conspicuousness: "A printed heading in
capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is con-
spicuous. Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in
larger or other contrasting type or color." 136
With these standards before us, let us now test a case under the
Code's disclaimer-of-warranty provision. To make it a fair test, let us
make one of the personae a consumer,' and, in fact, choose a dramatic
situation suggested by the Code itself.38s Sir Edmund Pillory, an
eminent mountain climber, enters Abercrombie & Fitch in New York to
buy some shoes. The salesman, recognizing Sir Edmund immediately,
rushes over to serve him. Sir Edmund orders "some good sturdy
shoes" and the salesman, knowing that they are wanted for Sir
Edmund's highly advertised impending climb up K-3, brings out a
pair which, while fine for walking upon ordinary ground, is hardly
sufficient for mountain climbing. Sir Edmund purchases the shoes,
and thereafter makes it only to roughly K-2/ 2 . His death is at least
arguably attributable to the inappropriate shoes. His executor sues
Abercrombie & Fitch for breach of warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. The store defends on the ground that on the sales form
handed to Sir Edmund at the time he purchased the shoes there was the
following form statement in red (a contrasting color) : "There are
no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
That is, the disclaimer was put in the exact language specified in
section 2-316(2) as being an incantation sufficient for this particular
purpose, and it is in a form defined by the Code as "conspicuous." In
fact, Sir Edmund never read the disclaimer, and had he done so, being
a man of action rather than words, he would not have understood it.
It would appear, nevertheless, that on these facts, the requirements of
the Code for the successful disclaimer of a warranty having been ex-
pressly met, Messrs. Abercrombie & Fitch would be home free under
2-316, and that this would be true even though Sir Edmund's claim is
136 UCC § 1-201 (10). The same provision makes conspicuousness seem even less
a matter of degree in the draftsmen's eyes by making it a question for the court rather
than the jury.
137 Cf. UCC § 2-719(3) (prima facie unconscionability of consumer-goods remedy
limitation).
138 See UCC § 2-315, comment 2, an attempt to flesh out the exact meaning of
"particular purpose": "For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of
walking upon ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular pair was
selected to be used for climbing mountains."
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for "injury to the person in the case of consumer goods," the limitation
of damages with respect to which would have been "prima facie un-
conscionable" under 2-719(3). Does the matter end there, however,
or may 2-302 nevertheless be applied to this state of facts to eliminate
the effect of the disclaimer as "unconscionable"? In other words,
given a careful meeting of the requirements of section 2-316 (the Code
section particularly devoted to warranty disclaimers), may the more
generally protective and loosely defined section devoted to general
naughtiness be invoked to avoid the harsh result?
Almost everyone seems to think so. It appears to be a matter of
common assumption that section 2-302 is applicable to warranty dis-
claimers."3 9  I find this, frankly, incredible. Here is 2-316 which sets
forth clear, specific and anything but easy-to-meet standards for dis-
claiming warranties. It is a highly detailed section, the comments to
which disclose full awareness of the problem at hand. It contains no
reference of any kind to section 2-302, although nine other sections of
article 2 contain such references. 4 ° In such circumstances the usually
bland assumptions that a disclaimer which meets the requirements of
2-316 might still be strikable as "unconscionable" under 2-302 seems
explainable, if at all, as oversight, wishful thinking or (in a rare case)
attempted sneakiness. 4'
Of course, the emotional pressure to reach a no-disclaimer result
via the unconscionability route if it cannot be done otherwise is under-
standable. One need only point out that if in the Henningsen case "4
the auto manufacturers had gotten together to agree upon a form of
disclaimer clause which accorded with the requirements of section 2-316,
under my view, Mrs. Henningsen's serious personal injuries would have
to go uncompensated. This would be so even though the auto manu-
139 Just to list some of the clearest cases, CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK
& TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, SUMMARY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE FOR
ILLINOIS 8 (1961) ("will perhaps find its most frequent use") ; Cudahy, Limitation
of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 MARQ. L. REV. 127, 128-29
(1963) ; Duesenberg, The Manufacturer's Last Stand: The Disclaimer, 20 Bus. LAW.
159, 162 (1964); Lauer, Sales Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
30 Mo. L. REv. 259, 283 (1965) ("would apply, of course"); Weeks, The Illinois
Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2-Sales, 50 ILL. B.J. 494, 516 (1962); Note,
45 IowA L. REv. 843, 857 (1960) ("All contractual provisions are subject") ; Note,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 420 (1961). See also Peters, Remedies for Breach of Con-
tracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Road-
map for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 282 (1963), recognizing the need for "a
sufficiently motivated court." A case taking the position clearly (but in dictum)
is Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Leg. J. 51, 57 n.3 (Erie County
Ct. Pa. 1961). But cf. Franklin, supra note 115, at 994-95, 1013-14, for a more
skeptical position.
14oUCC §§ 2-202, 2-204, 2-205, 2-207, 2-303, 2-508, 2-615, 2-718, 2-719.
141 In this last category see Note, 43 B.U.L. REv. 396, 403-04 (1963), a disingenu-
ous (or ingenious) attempt to suggest that if the comments to the section indicate
that the section would not apply, the comments, since not "part of" the statute, ought
to be disregarded.
14 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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facturers had the oligopolistic power to make the terms of their con-
tracts unbargainable. Any court might find it intolerable to allow a
rich auto manufacturer to avoid making restitution for injuries suffered
through the breakdown of a dangerous instrument it manufactured
merely because it had made verbal compliance with a talismanic form
of words which may not have been read or understood by the pur-
chaser,143 and about which he could have done nothing even if he had
read, understood and objected. Such a decision would be an exceed-
ingly painful one to announce. But that is what the statute says.
There is nothing to prevent a legislature from regulating certain par-
ticular contractual provisions out of existence, as they have done on
innumerable occasions in the past.' Certainly there is not much force
remaining in simplistic freedom-of-contract arguments that legis-
latures may not determine, as a matter of policy, that some things in
contracts just won't go. 45 The Code itself goes that route in other
places ' 46 and there would have been nothing offensive in doing so with
respect to warranty disclaimers, especially with respect to consumer
goods. What is offensive is the seeming attempt on the part of some
commentators to nullify the legislative determination that warranty dis-
claimers, for the time being at least, may continue."' Even legis-
latures, one would think, are entitled to some protection from oppression
and unfair surprise.
148 The court in Henningsen might and may have relied upon the "hidden-
provision" argument alone to reach its result. See 74 HIv. L. REv. 630, 631 (1961).
144 For instance, for a whole list of such statutory prescriptions applicable specifi-
cally to the consumer-contract field, see CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONStUWM CREDIT
LEGISLATION 311-22 (1965).
145 That government has such power is today accepted almost as a postulate,
see, e.g., GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 109 (1953); RADCLUFE,
THE LAW AND ITS COMPASS 65-66 1960), the powerful and successful attacks on
overenthusiastic interpretations of "freedom of contract!' having come a long time
ago. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) ; Hamilton, Freedom of Contract, 3 ENCY. Soc. Sc. 450 (1931). That does
not mean that the attractions of that "freedom" are wholly gone. Compare Pound,
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909), with Pound, Law in the Service State:
Freedom Versus Equality, 36 A.B.A.J. 977, 1050-53 (1950).
The feeling that there once was a time when men's promises were more trust-
worthy is not a new one. See Chaucer, Lak of Stedfastness (ca. 1385), in RoBINsoN,
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF GEOFFREY CHAUCER 632 (1933):
Somtyme the world was so stedfast and stable
That mannes word was obligacioun.
146 See, e.g., UCC §§ 2-725(1) (short statutes of limitation); 9-318(4) (pro-
hibition of account assignments not permitted). Indeed the exclusion of the buyer's
family from his warranty protection has simply been forbidden by § 2-318.
147 Compare the Code's express ducking of any express position in the developing
area of privity of warranty (beyond protecting household members), UCC § 2-318,
comment 3. It is not as if this warranty area is one without political sensitivity or
strong feelings. See, e.g., Condon, The Practical Impact of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on Food Poisoning Cases, 5 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 213 (1950);
Dierson, Report on the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 6 FOOD DRUG CosM.
L.J. 943 (1951); Duesenberg, The Manufacturer's Last Stand: The Disclaimer, 20
Bus. LAW. 159 (1964).
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If one concludes, however, as I do, that if there is one sales-contract
provision to which 2-302 does not apply it is the warranty disclaimer,
then both kinds of clauses dealt with in the official-comment cases are
totally regulated by sections of the Code other than 2-302. But may
one not reason by analogy from the warranty-disclaimer and remedy-
limitation clauses at issue in the official comment cases to clauses which
are "like" them but do not have any specific applicable section of the
Code? 148 The answer, I think, is no. First let us recall that we are
not talking here of procedural unconscionability. Assuming that a
certain level of bargaining nastiness is reached, any harsh clause may
be strikable; but we are talking, remember, of form contracts, or at
most of contracts of adhesion, contracts whose provisions cannot be
handled in any per se simplified manner. Thus we are speaking of
what is "like" a warranty disclaimer as a substantive provision. What
is that? Basically, it is a provision which shifts a risk from party A
to party B when party A is, arguably, better able to appreciate, avoid
and stand that risk. 49 Put briefly, can we assume that a provision is
unconscionable and voidable if (a) it is in a form contract or a contract
of adhesion and (b) it makes the poorer party stand a substantial loss
which the richer party could stand better? Moreover, it must be re-
called that the Code most specifically did not declare warranty dis-
claimers and remedy limitations void. Instead it regulated them in
detail. Is one to assume that while the paradigms are to be regulated
the clauses "like" them are to be voided instead? What analogy sug-
gests here is not similarity of treatment, but unspecified variation
instead.
The official-comment cases do illustrate, if nothing else, the re-
sponses of judges in the throes of one of the dilemmas of the judicial
process, and that, if nothing else, is what they were designed to
illustrate. In the first draft of 2-302,15° there was no mention of
illustrative cases, though Professor Llewellyn showed himself aware
of what judges do when they face an apparent duty to reach harsh
results in a particular case."5' The very next time comments to a draft
were prepared, however, they closed with the following paragraph:
148 Cf. Braucher, Sale of Goods in the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LA. L. REv.
192, 204 (1966) :
Perhaps these more specific provisions [§§ 1-102, 2-309, 2-616, 2-718, 2-719]
help give content to the word unconscionable. Perhaps it can be held to
contracts and clauses which have similar vices.
But he continues with some skepticism: "Certainly it is not a warrant for judicial
price control. But people worry and you can see why."
149 See Franklin, suipra note 115, for an excellent particularized summary of what
might be wrong with warranty disclaimers.
150 MmiEo 1941 DRAFT § 1-C.
151 MmxO 1941 DRAFT § 1-C, comment A(7).
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Illustrations are needed, and they should indicate also the
degree to which the courts have gone in avoiding the effect
of forms which had been signed but which were felt by
the courts to be unconscionable in the circumstances.
152
Whatever else was then intended, therefore (and the "also" does imply
a nonunitary purpose), illustration of the judges' pre-Code harshness-
evading techniques was, from the beginning, one of the reasons for the
projected cases' inclusion. Thus it was not surprising that while the
very next version of the comments did not mention the point,5 3 when
they were violently revised the following year they began as follows:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts
to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they
find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been
accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manip-
ulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determina-
tions that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the
dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended
to allow the court to pass on the unconscionability of the
contract or particular clause therein and to make a conclusion
of law as to its unconscionability. . . . The underlying
basis of this section is illustrated by results in cases such as
the following."'
There then followed the citation of ten cases, each accompanied by its
own individual brief descriptive tag-indeed the ten cases and tags,
which, still pristinely unchanged, grace the present first comment to
section 2-302.'
Assuming, therefore, that the ten cases are to illustrate what judges
do when faced with appealing fact situations and unhelpful legal doc-
152 AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UmnFoRmt REvIsED SALES ACT, Informal Appendix,
at 12 (3d Draft 1943).
-53 See 1949 DRAFT § 2-302.
154 1950 DmRFT § 2-302, comment 1.
An interesting foreshadowing of this language may be found in 2 GENY, MEHODE
D'INTERIRETATION § 174, at 420 (2d ed. 1954). The language is not, however, quite
close enough to support attributing it as the source of the comment.
155 This fidelity to original reading has at least one untoward result: Kansas
Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks, 100 Kan. 376, 164 Pac. 273 (1917), has remained mis-
described to date. Its tag says that under a clause permitting the buyer, upon the
seller's default, to "extend time of delivery, cancel contract, or buy in for [seller's]
account," 100 Kan. at 376-77, 164 Pac. at 274, "in a rising market the court permitted
the buyer to measure his damages for non-delivery at the end of only one 30-day
postponement." In fact, the buyer never attempted to extend the contract for more
than one additional period, it was a fifteen-day period in any event, and the propriety
of that extension was expressly sustained by the Kansas Supreme Court which indeed
reversed the trial court's contrary holding on that particular point.
In addition, one would think that even in 1950 it was not necessary to use a
collection of illustrative cases the most recent of which was decided in 1937 and over
half of which were decided before 1929. One suspects the mining of a secondary
source, but like an archaeologist finding a large selection of Egyptian shards in a
Greek pit, one can suspect a prior collector without knowing who he was.
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trines, how do they do that job? First, they illustrate only "adverse
construction of language," which is only one of the four evasive tech-
niques named in the comment.5 They do not exemplify "manipulation
of the rules of offer and acceptance," or any findings that a clause is
contrary to "the dominant purpose of the contract." Certainly none
of the cases says that the clause is bad as "contrary to public policy."
Thus, the cases are apparently not designed to be exhaustive on the
subject of manipulative techniques. What they do illustrate, however,
and quite well,157 is the skewing of legal doctrine that may be caused
by an emotional pressure to get a more heartwarming particular result.
It cannot be denied that uncertainty of a particularly virulent kind
enters the picture when the basis of a decision and its stated basis part
company. 58 This uncertainty, coupled with the distorting effect on
legal doctrine of generous manipulations to get "good" results (that
is, the "pore-ole-widder-lady" syndrome 15) was fully appreciated by
the chief draftsman before the drafting started,"" was adverted to in
the very first comment ever appended to foetal 2-302,161 and con-
tinued to be firm in his thought well after the Code was completed.0 2
It was this tendency which the express and open invalidating power
given to the judges was designed to prevent. As Professor Llewellyn
put it, "covert tools are never reliable tools." 13
If, therefore, this uncertainty and skewing of doctrine could be
prevented by something like section 2-302, its inclusion in the Code,
despite the difficulties involved, might be justified. How much of a
gain, however, is likely when there is substituted for the court's ob-
ligation to give false reasons for its behavior, a specific power to give
no reason at all? An answer may come from what the courts thus
far have done with their shiny new weapon in the very few cases in
156 UCC § 2-302, comment 1.
157 Cases showing the manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance might
have better illustrated the point. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton Institute v. Jones,
234 Ill. App. 444 (1924) (a save-the-correspondence-school-student case).
18 See Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., [1934] 1 K.B. 17 (C.A.), in which
Scrutton, L.J., said of the warranty disclaimer in issue, "Clause 5 is, I take it, a
sequel to Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes [[1910] 2 K-B. 1003; [1911] A.C.
394]" and went on thereafter to say,
Those advising the present defendants . . . appear to have thought that by
the inclusion of the word "conditions" [as suggested by the Wallis, Son &
Wells case] . . . liability would be excluded. . . . [1934] 1 K.B. at 21-22.
Scrutton found the advisors wrong, again by "interpretation of language."
159 See, for instance, its illustration for recent law students in FULLER & BRAUCHER,
BASIC CONTRACT LAW 792 (1964), where Fox v. Grange, 261 Ill. 116, 103 N.E. 576
(1913) is printed (masquerading as a cancellation-of-waiver case).
160 See Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939).
161 See MIMEO 1941 DRAFT § 1-C, comment A (7).
162 See LLEWELLYN, THE Comtmox LAW TRADITION 364-65 (1960) quoting at
length from his Book Review, supra note 160.
163 Ibid.
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which it has thus far figured. But first it will be useful to consider
another place in the law where judges were, arguably, given the
power to decide cases on the basis of the high level abstraction,
"unconscionability."
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EQUITY
It is the most common thing in the world for a commentator on
section 2-302, apparently impelled by the obvious fact that the section
itself embodies no noncircular standards, to lessen his nervousness by
pointing to the equity court's old and well-established unconscionability
doctrine as a sufficient illumination of the Code provision.1' "After
all," he seems to say, "why get excited? This is nothing new." 10
Moreover, among the works most frequently pointing with elaborate
but unelaborated calm to the equity doctrine are substantially all of the
"official" state studies, undertaken generally for the guidance of legis-
latures.'" One gets the impression, in fact, that everyone who thought
of mentioning the equity doctrine mentioned it.
164A fair sampling would include 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.1603, at 46 (1964); Charney, How to Make a
Contract Under the U.C.C., 16 BROOKLYN BARRISTER 18, 27 (1964) ; Held & Torbert,
Comparison of Articles Two and Three of the Uniform Commercial Code With the
Law of Alabama, 7 ALA. L. REv. 271, 287 (1955) ; Kuenzel, Uniform Commercial
Code: Its Effect on Floridds Existing Law of Sales, 36 FLA. B.J. 1020, 1027 (1962) ;
Leflar, The Commercial Code in Arkansas, 14 ARK. L. REV. 302, 308 (1960) ; Loren-
sen, The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article Compared With West Virginia
Law, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 142, 143 (1962) ; Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts
Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap
for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 202 n.10 (1963) ; Stockton, Sales Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Significant Changes, 20 ALA. LAW. 352, 359 (1959);
Weeks, supra note 139, at 517; Note, 58 DICK. L. REv. 161 (1954) ; Note, 22 TENN.
L. REv. 776, 793 (1953); Project, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1087, 1131 (1963).
165 See, e.g., Charney, supra note 164, at 27 ("Actually all this section ...
Leflar, supra note 164, at 308 ("This amounts essentially to . ").
This "nothing new" argument must be distinguished from the "nothing new"
argument about the contractual manipulations of common-law judges to get just
results. See, e.g., § 2-302, comment 1; Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code"
Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 305-07 (1962); Note, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 401,
402 (1961). This latter argument was broached in Llewellyn's first commentary on
a proto-2-302, MIMEO 1941 DRAFT § 1-C, comment A(7).
166E.g., California Annotations to the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, in
[CALIFORNIA] SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 41-42 (1961) ; STARR, STUDY AND REPORT ON THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 20, 71-72 (1959) (prepared for Connecticut Temporary
Commission to Study and Report on the Uniform Commercial Code); ILLINOIS
COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES, ILLINOIS
ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 49 (1960); KENTUCKY LEGIS-
LATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ANALYSIS OF EFFECT ON
EXISTING KENTUCKY LAW 43 (Research Publication No. 49, 1957); MASSACHUSETTS
ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 31 (1953) ("Prepared
by a Group of Massachusetts Lawyers and Law School Professors") ; STEINHEIMER,
MICHIGAN SALES LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 36 (1963); BAR Asso-
CIATION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, NEW HAMPSHIRE ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 24 (1959) ; NEW JERSEY UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE STUDY
COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT TO THE GovERNOR, THE SENATE AND THE AssEUMZLY
OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 52 (1960); HOGAN & PENNY, ANNOTATIONS OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO THE STATUTORY AND DECISIONAL LAW OF NEW YORK
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This near unanimity of belief in the relevance of equity uncon-
scionability is all the more striking in that neither section 2-302 nor
its accompanying commentary makes any mention of it. Once upon
a time it did, very clearly and explicitly, but the reference came late in
the section's drafting history and didn't last very long. The May 1949
Draft's first accompanying comment began:
This section is intended to apply to the field of Sales the
equity courts' ancient policy of policing contracts for uncon-
scionability or unreasonableness. 67
That sentence lasted just about a year. In the very next draft of this
comment, though the remainder of the paragraph in which it appeared
remained wholly unchanged, the quoted sentence was deleted in its
entirety.' And that sums up the entire history of overt references to
the equity unconscionability doctrine in the Code; 169 it never appeared
again.'70
Well, not quite. If one looks at the current version of the Code,
while there is nothing about the equity doctrine in section 2-302, and
while the comments accompanying it make no such reference, and
while none of the ten cases cited and described in the first official
comment as "illustrating" the "underlying basis of the section" had
anything to do with a request for specific performance or even came up
in equity, there is one reference which may be significant. In the 1952
version of the official comments a key segment was changed from the
way it had appeared in the 1950 version, as indicated below by italics:
STATE 35 (1961); OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, Oxio ANNOTATIONS TO
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 17 (1960); OREGON STATE BAR COMMITTEE ON
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUcATION, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 35-36 (1963) ;
PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY JOINT STATE COMMISSION, PENNSYLVANIA ANNO-
TATION TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 18 (1953); FuRLow, REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION [of the State of Rhode Island] TO STUDY AND REPORT
ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 22 (1960). Some state studies seemed to see
no particular problem, e.g., VIRGINIA CODE COMMISSION, REPORT ON UNIFORM Com-
MERCIAL CODE 19 (House Doc. No. 28, 1955). Others do see some definitional prob-
lem but nevertheless do not rely on the old equity practices. E.g., MISSOURI GENERAL
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE :ITs EFFECT UPON COGNATE MISSOURI STATUTES 48 (1954) ; TEXAS LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 55-58 (1953).
167 1949 DRAFT § 2-302, comment 1. At no time in the drafting history of § 2-302
was the equity practice adverted to in the text of the statute itself.
168 See 1950 DRAFT § 2-302, comment 2. (The whole comment had dropped down
to second place.)
109 References to the equity practice of "reformation" did appear in earlier drafts,
beginning with 1943 DRAFr § 24, and were not eliminated until 1948 DRAFT § 23. But
these were not references to the equity unconscionability doctrine.
170 In fact, at the May 1951 meeting an effort was made to assure the section
against any misinterpretation that solely an equity application was meant. See AMmU-
CAN LAw INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, MAY MEETING REVISIONS TO
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. 2, §2-302 (1951):
The words "refuse to enforce" are to be reconsidered for rephrasing to avoid
inference that it deals only with the question of specific performance.
No change came out of this reconsideration, however.
1967]
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The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise (Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d
80, 3d Cir. 1948) and not of disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power.
1
This, of course, is how this segment reads today. Now, the Campbell
Soup case was a case in equity, and in fact had precisely to do with a
request for specific performance. And, moreover, in that case the Third
Circuit 7 denied specific performance on the explicit ground that the
contract involved in the case was "unconscionable." "' "That equity
does not enforce unconscionable bargains," said the court without
elaborate citation,171 "is too well established to require elaborate
citation." 176
Taking the identity of the words "unconscionable" in the Code
section and in the equity doctrine, together with this rather obscure
reference to the Campbell Soup case, there is some justification for the
widespread belief that section 2-302 is just tried and true equity
applied to the field of Sales. It does seem to me that if the draftsmen
had meant to signal the importation into the statute of such a vast
body of decisions and learned commentary as the equity doctrine in-
volves 177 they might have chosen a reference less coy than a "cf."
citation 178 to a single equity case. But let us assume that the doctrine
was meant to be applicable.
Now, as a rough guess I would say that there are as many cases
dealing with denials of specific performance as stars in the heavens or
sand by the sea. The divers reasons given for such refusals are almost as
171 Compare 1952 DRAFT § 2-302, comment 1, with 1950 DRAFT § 2-302, comment 1.
172 See UCC § 2-302, comment 1.
37- In an opinion by Judge Goodrich, at that time Chairman of the Editorial
Board and Director of the American Law Institute. See 1949 DRAFT, Foreword at v.
174 The lower court had rested its decision upon the ground that the carrots
involved in the case were not "unique" enough to justify specific performance. The
Court of Appeals specifically rejected that ground for dismissing the bill, choosing
instead to rely on the unconscionability doctrine. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,
172 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1948).
175 The citation (172 F.2d at 83 n.12) is limited to two treatises: 4 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1405a (5th ed. Symons 1941), and 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1425 (rev. ed. 1937).
176 172 F.2d at 83.
177 Treatments of various degrees of completeness, often accompanied by massive
case citations, are found in 2 CHAFEE & SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY 1173-93, 1345-88
(1934); CLARK, EQUITY §§ 168-70 (1919); DE FUNIAK, MODERN EQUITY §§ 94, 95
(2d ed. 1956); FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE §§ 387-459 (6th ed. Northcote 1921);
MCCLINTOcK, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 69-72 (2d ed. 1948) ; 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 926-28 (5th ed. Symons 1941); PoMERoY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF CONTRACTS §§ 40, 46, 175-97 (3d ed. 1926) ; SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 501-06,
551-52 (25th ed. Megarry & Baker 1960); WALSH, EQUITY § 104 (1930); Annot.,
65 A.L.R. 7 (1930).
178 Which means, I assume, as it always has, something like "this fits here, but
I can't tell how." Cf. HARVARD LAw REVIEW ASSOCIATION, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION §27:2:4 (10th ed. 1958).
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extensive. To be enforced specifically a contract must first be a contract,
and thus the issues of capacity, consideration, agreement and formality
are as relevant to equitable as to legal contract actions.179  Certainly
those failings in the contracting behavior of one of the parties which
would prevent relief being given him at law will ordinarily prevent his
procuring specific performance in equity. 80 But in addition to these
considerations which are applicable both to legal and equitable actions
are others which are recognized only in courts of equity as applicable
to specific performance. Pomeroy saw these additional considerations
merely as applications of "the grand and far-reaching principle that he
who seeks equity must do equity," 181 but whatever their genesis, they
are various and numerous:
the specific performance of a contract will be refused when
the plaintiff has obtained the agreement by sharp and un-
scrupulous practices, by overreaching, by concealment of im-
portant facts, by trickery, by taking undue advantage of his
position, or by other means which are unconscientious; and
when the contract itself is unfair, one-sided, unconscionable,
or affected by any other such inequitable feature, and where
the specific enforcement would be oppressive or harsh upon
the defendant, or would prevent the enjoyment of his own
rights, or would in any other manner work injustice.'8
Briefly put, when one examines any number of these equity cases -1 at
all it becomes abundantly clear that over and above fraud, misrepre-
sentation, mistake and duress there is a whole universe of kinds of
bargaining which, while not sufficient to justify the voiding of a con-
tract, will support a refusal specifically to enforce it, and that beyond
the illegality and "against public policy" rubrics of law, are kinds of
contracts which equity will not affirmatively aid.'
84
Within the ambit of those factors of contract-procuring behavior
which would result in a denial of specific performance, a bewildering
179 See PoMERoY, SPEcMc PERFORMANCE OF CoNTRcs §§ 51-161 (3d ed. 1926).
180 See id. §§ 209-28 (misrepresentation), 229-66 (mistake), 267-79 (fraud),
280-87 (illegality).
181 Id. § 40.
182Ibid. This, by the way, is merely a somewhat expanded version of the
Pomeroy summation cited by the court in the Campbell Soup case. See note 175 supra.
183 1 have not come close to reading all of the thousands of cases dealing with
unconscionability in equity. Moreover, those which I have read have not been selected
according to any plan of reasoned randomness. A more extensive study of these
cases might yield, therefore, further or other generalizations.
184 The classic citation for this power to deny specific performance on grounds
insufficient to justify cancellation of the contract is Day v. Newman, 2 Cox Ch. 77,
30 Eng. Rep. 36 (Ch. 1788), in which, faced with cross bills for specific performance
and for cancellation, the Master of the Rolls dismissed both bills. (When the plaintiff
refused to rescind the contract in exchange for an award of costs, the bills were
dismissed without costs, too.) See for a more modern and equally clear example,
Kleinberg v. Ratett, 252 N.Y. 236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929).
1967]
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number of permutations work to inform the chancellor's discretion. In
these cases one runs continually into the old,' the young,"6 the
ignorant,187 the necessitous,- 8 the illiterate,'89 the improvident,' the
drunken,'" the naive"'9 and the sick,' 93 all on one side of the trans-
action, with the sharp and hard ' on the other. Language of quasi-
fraud 19 and quasi-duress 198 abounds. Certain whole classes of pre-
sumptive sillies like sailors ' and heirs 1" and farmers 19  and
185 E.g., Blackwilder v. Loveless, 21 Ala. 371 (1852) ; Banaghan v. Malaney, 200
Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (1908); Hemhauser v. Hemhauser, 110 N.J. Eq. 77, 158 Atl.
762 (N.J. Ch. 1932).
186E.g., Clitherall v. Ogilvie, 1 Desaussure Ch. 250, 261 (S.C. 1792) ("Young
heirs even when at age . . ").
187 E.g., Fish v. Leser, 69 Ill. 394 (1873) ; Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46,
85 N.E. 839 (1908); Dysarz v. Janczarek, 238 Mich. 529, 213 N.W. 694 (1927);
Fitzpatrick v. Dorland, 27 Hun (34 N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 291 (1882).
188 .g., Blackwilder v. Loveless, 21 Ala. 371, 373 (1852) ("being a poor man
...he [entered into the contract] to save his crop") ; Fitzpatrick v. Dorland, .upra
note 187, at 292 ("pecuniarily embarrassed").
189 .g., Dysarz v. Janczarek, 238 Mich. 529, 213 N.W. 694 (1927); Caton v.
Wellershouse, 77 Pa. Super. 331 (1921).
190 E.g., Clitherall v. Ogilvie, 1 Desaussure Ch. 250 (S.C. 1792).
191 E.g., Knott v. Giles, 27 App. D.C. 581 (1906) ("habitual drunkard") ; Moetzel
& Muttera v. Koch, 122 Iowa 196, 97 N.W. 1079 (1904); see also Campbell v.
Spencer, 2 Binn. (11 Pa.) 129, 133 (1809) (drunkenness not proved but "bargaining
• . .amidst the drinking of bitters early in the morning").
192 E.g., Bartley v. Lindabury, 89 N.J. Eq. 8, 10, 104 Atl. 333, 334 (Ch. 1918)
(farmer "unfamiliar with business methods") ; Smedes v. Wild, 1 Livingston's Law
Mag. 155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1852) ("contract between a businessman and an inexperienced
woman") ; Campbell v. Spencer, supra note 191, at 133 ("and I do not like a contract
by which a farmer is involved in the folly of buying a store of goods.").
'93 E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Dorland, 27 Hun. (34 N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 291, 292 (1882)
("invalid, very infirm").
194 E.g., Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (1908); Kelley v.
York Cliffs Improvement Co., 94 Me. 374, 47 Atl. 898 (1900) (even though defendant
was a corporation); Wilson v. Bergmann, 112 Neb. 145, 198 N.W. 671 (1924) ; Hem-
hauser v. Hemhauser, 110 N.J. Eq. 77, 158 Atl. 762 (Ch. 1932) (stepchild of old"widder" lady) ; Falcke v. Gray, 4 Drew. 651, 62 Eng. Rep. 250 (Ch. 1859) (antique
dealer, lady and valuable china). Of course, even if a court makes no special point
of the plaintiff's behavior in any given case, getting a very good deal from the old,
the sick, the drunk, etc., is itself hardly a character reference.
195E.g., Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 237 (1892) ("the contract
'was an artfully contrived snare "); Gabrielson v. Hogan, 298 Fed. 722, 725 (8th
Cir. 1924) ("the Hogans were strangers").
.'9 Pindall v. Waterman, 84 Ark. 575, 106 S.W. 964 (1907) (conveyance to
attorneys with lynch mob in offing-set aside) ; Blackwilder v. Loveless, 21 Ala. 371,
373 (1852) ("to save his crop").
'97 E.g., How v. Weldon, 2 Ves. Sr. 516, 518, 28 Eng. Rep. 330, 331 (Ch. 1754)
("a race of men loose and unthinking"). Compare the treatment of the same class
in a different context, American maintenance-and-cure decisions, e.g., Koistinen v.
American Export Lines, Inc., 194 Misc. 942, 83 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948)
(leaping from brothel window part of normal sailor's normal duties-under the cir-
cumstances). See generally GiLmORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-8 (1957).
198 E.g., Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.
1750); Clitherall v. Ogilvie, 1 Desaussure Ch. 250, 261 (S.C. 1792) ("Young heirs
even when at age are under the care of this court").
99 E.g., Koch v. Streuter, 232 Ill. 594, 83 N.E. 1072 (1908); Bartley v. Linda-
bury, 89 N.J. Eq. 8, 104 Atl. 333 (1918) ; Campbell v. Spencer, 2 Binn. (11 Pa.) 129
(1809).
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women 200 continually wander on and off stage. Those not certifiably
crazy, but nonetheless pretty peculiar, 01 are often to be found. And
in most of the cases, of course, several of these factors appear in com-
bination.22 It might be assumed, therefore, that one setting out to
find a body of decisions which might give contour and limits to a word
like "unconscionability," at least insofar as that word might have some-
thing to do with the insufficiency of the bargaining process, would find
in these cases riches beyond the dreams of judicial avarice. There is,
however, one weakness in using these cases as a guide to the meaning
of unconscionability in section 2-302: they are all irrelevant-for two
reasons. First, the equity cases are of interest, if at all, only for giving
outline to the limits of procedural unconscionability; they cannot define
what kind of clause might be substantively unconscionable because they
all involve only one form of substantive unconscionability--overall im-
balance. Second, on procedural unconscionability, the dramatic situa-
tions which have produced the contracts which have produced the
equity cases are exceedingly unlikely to be reproduced in a Sales context
except on the very rarest of occasions, and thus their details do not
inform the sales-contract decision a bit.
Procedural Unconscionability in Equity
It is a commonplace, even in the very best of circles,203 to view
with more than equanimity the application of equitable doctrines to
actions at law. This is undoubtedly to some extent the natural
by-product of the merger of legal and equitable procedures in modem
codes,'04 but the trend can hardly be considered merely an offshoot of
adjective reform. There are arguments, occasionally quite passionate,205
that the importation has not gone far enough,206 and it is very clear that
the extended use of at least some equitable doctrine is becoming more
200 Smedes v. Wild, 1 Livingston's Law Mag. 155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) ; Friend
v. Lamb, 152 Pa. 529, 536, 25 At. 577, 579 (1893) (married woman with only "very
recent emancipation").
2 0 1 E.g., Wilson v. Bergmann, 112 Neb. 145, 198 N.W. 671 (1924); Miller v.
Tjexhus, 20 S.D. 12, 104 N.W. 519 (1905). Cf. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency
and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 306-07 (1944), arguing
that when courts say they have found "mental incompetency" they usually mean only
that they have found a peculiar deal.
202 See, e.g., Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (1908), involving
an "aged, inexperienced and ignorant woman."
203 See, e.g., FuiLLm & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACr LAW 754 (1964).
204 E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 2; Mo. R. Civ. P. 42.01.
205 E.g., Newman, The Place and Function of Pure Equity in the Structure of
Law, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 401 (1965).
206 See NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A CoARATIvE STUDY 115 (1961); Puig
Brutau, Juridical Evolution and Equity, in ESSAYS IN JU SPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF
RoscoB POUND 82 (1962).
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frequent. 0 7 Insofar as the wisdom of this trend, or at least of its
accelerated development, is questioned, it is generally on the ground
that too much faith in increased judicial discretion (considered a hall-
mark of equity jurisprudence) as a simplified way to "justice" is
dangerous, or at least over-sanguine.20 8 On the other hand, some
doctrines developed in courts of equity are perfectly applicable to law
actions, and their exclusion therefrom is absurd. In other words, there
is nothing in an "equitable" doctrine as such that particularly makes
it unfitted for importation into an action which would historically have
been an action "at law."
Merely that there is no a priori reason why doctrines developed
in equity might not fit equally well in law actions, does not justify the
jumped conclusion that all equitable doctrines fit equally well at law.
Put more concretely for present purposes, the practice of denying
specific performance in equity to contracts because of their "uncon-
scionability," does not necessarily make any sense when applied to the
law of Sales. It might be sensible. In fact, it isn't.
Almost without exception, actions for specific performance were
(and are) brought with respect to transactions involving real prop-
erty." Article 2 of the Code governs "goods" only, and real property
is not a species of "goods." 211 One well might argue that the subject
207 See M.M.W., Equity in the Commercial World, 105 L.J. 627 (1955); Van
Hecke, Changing Emphases in Specific Performance, 40 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1961);
Note, 49 IOWA L. Rxv. 1290 (1964).
208 See CaRDozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 136 ("benevolent despotism"
of Judges), 141 ("the judge . . . is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit
of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness") ; EVERSHED, ASPECTS OF ENGLISH EQUITY
16-17 (1954) ; LUNDSTEDT, LAW AND JUSTICE 30-39 (1952) ; Berozheimer, The Perils
of Emotionalism, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 166, 185 (1921); Cohen, Jerome
Frank, in COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 357, 362 (1931) ("uncontrolled dis-
cretion of judges would make modern complex life unbearable") ; Wright, Opposition
of Law to Business Usages, 26 COLUm. L. REv. 917, 917 n.1 (1926) ; Mann, Book
Review, 80 L.Q. REV. 589, 590 (1964) ("the present unfortunate tendency towards a
system of Cadi jurisprudence"). See also Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German
Law, 28 J. CoMP. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 15, 23 (1946); Liberman, Opportunity
and Challenge to Bring Commercial Law in Step With Present Day Needs, 62 Com.
L.J. 221, 226 (1957), citing HEDEMANN, DIE FLUCHT IN DIE GENERALKLAUSEN [The
Flight into the General Clauses] 1-4, 6-12, 46-52 (1933), on the temptations and
dangers of broad discretionary standards in the hands of a burgeoning totalitarian
state. The Hedemann book is in German only, which I can not read, so I have not
read it. In this same connection, see the charming understatement in PRAUSNITZ, THE
STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW
6-7 (1937): "In 1934 General Goering . . . said: 'The law and the will of the
Fuehrer are one.' This maxim by itself may influence the interpretation of certain
contracts."
It should not be thought that the above-cited works are necessarily simple-
mindedly against judicial discretion; in fact portions cited are more often than not
caveats tacked onto the explicit recognition of the need for judicial discretion, e.g.,
CARnozo, op. cit. supra at 124, 129, 136-58.
209 McCLINTOCK, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 44 (2d ed. 1948); POMEROY,
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 10 (3d ed. 1926). But see Van Hecke,
supra note 207; Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
210 UCC §§ 2-102, 2-105.
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matter of a transaction might reasonably have an effect upon the form
it takes, and upon the legal rules which might develop to confine, define
and delimit that form. Put into contract-teacher terminology, widgits
and Blackacre are not the same, are not dealt with by parties in the
same way and (at least arguably) ought not to be treated identically
in law.2 ' In still other words, the successful struggle to unhorse Sales
which the Code represents 212 may have resulted in its unhappy im-
plantation in alien soil.
Land transactions and chattel transactions are different because
land and chattels are different. This is not to say that they are in all
ways different, or that they can never reasonably be treated by the law
as if they were not different, but only to suggest that the realty-
personalty dichotomy is not arbitrary. To the extent that real dis-
tinctions do exist between the two subject matters, the learning sur-
rounding the equity unconscionability doctrine, a specific performance
doctrine and a land doctrine, may be inapplicable, and if applied to
Sales, misleading. This depends, of course, on the extent to which the
two subject matters do differ.
First, as a general rule a real estate transaction is likely to be
economically significant for at least one, and often both, of the parties
to it. It would be my guess that both at the time the equity doctrine
was developing, and today, the largest single transaction which most
people will enter into during their lives will be a real estate transaction
of one sort or another. It is true that the purchase of the ubiquitous
automobile is no trivial transaction today, but more is ordinarily in-
volved in the family's home purchase. Even between professional real
estate traders, each transaction is likely to involve more dollars than
in most other businesses where the units of "merchandise" are smaller.
Thus a disparity between "value" and price would more likely be
a serious economic hardship with respect to land than elsewhere.
Second, as a general rule land transactions are more likely to be
one-in-a-lifetime transactions for at least one of the parties than the
commercial transactions the Code is primarily designed to govern. This
would tend to limit those protections against overreaching which follow
from a businessman's desire to build a following, to establish and
maintain as continual and continuous a relationship as possible. In
211 This suggestion that the subject matter of a transaction determines the law
which will grow up around it, and that such law may be absurd when applied to a
totally different kind of transaction is, of course, hardly original. A most completely
developed exploration of the insightful point that sales of widgitis differ from dickers
over Dobbin is to be found in Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52
HARv. L. REv. 873 (1939).
212 That business had progressed beyond Dobbin was appreciated by some rather
early in that progression. See Note, 27 COLUM. L. Rav. 430, 435 n.20 (1927) ("dis-
appearance of the horse-trade manner of doing business").
1967]
536 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
other words, businessmen's accommodations, even when dealing with
consumers, are lessened when the transaction, because of the nature of
its subject matter, is relatively unlikely to be repeated between the
same parties.2 3
Third, in spite of the homogenization of land in the modem
world, and its transformation into more and more of a commodity
(like the Code's "goods"), land is not just treated as unique in
equity,214 it ordinarily is unique. That is, if the character of an object
is dependent upon its surroundings, and both it and its surroundings
are immovable, then no other object is the same, or can be. One can
of course buy land for purposes with respect to which both its inherent
character and its position is relatively irrelevant. I would be willing
to guess that much Iowa corn land, as well as much Texas grazing land,
is substantially interchangeable (or at least so it seems to one raised
in New York) and it is very hard to see the distinction between various
addresses in Levittown. But it often is the case that land is chosen for
either its intrinsic character (e.g., soil richness) or its relational char-
acter (e.g., nearness to a particular school). Because these factors are
effectively irrevocable and irreparable (i.e., it is hard to turn sand to
loam or move a school), transactions with respect to this type of
commodity are transactions with respect to a semi-permanent personal
commitment of some sort, and the legal rules that govern it would
reasonably tend to be hedged with additional restrictions." 5
Most important, real property is likely to be the only thing that
relatively unsophisticated people have which is worth tricking them
out of. Farmers have farms and old ladies have old homesteads. The
equity cases are replete with factual patterns involving the old being
bilked,2"6 and farmers sweet-talked into ruinous trades.21 7  Courts
would be most solicitous to impede land transfers by the poor sillies of
the world.218
213 Cf. Jones, Merchants, The Law Merchant, and Recent Missouri Sales Cases:
Some Reflections, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 397, 411-18; Jones, Three Centuries of Com-
mercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 193, 218-19.
See also FRIEDMAN, CONTRACr LAW IN AMECA 46-48 (1965), on the effect of non-
repetitiveness on the morals of Wisconsin real estate brokers.2 14 McCiNTOCK, op. cit. supra note 209; POmERoY, op. cit. supra note 209.
215 This discussion does not take into account the exceedingly powerful senti-
mental-mystical aspects of land, the Tara and Mother Russia complexes of Gone
With the Wind and War and Peace, for instance. These feelings, moreover, are
apparently not even in any obvious relation to the objective charm of the land involved.
See ROLVAAG, GIANTS IN THE EARTH (1927) (Dakota prairie). See also FRIEDMAN,
op. cit. supra note 213, at 35, on the transformation of land from commodity to
"differentiated space value" in Wisconsin.
216 See, e.g., cases cited note 185 supra.
217 See, e.g., cases cited note 199 supra.
218 And it is a "commodity" which often needs a judicial imprimatur of some
sort to render it resalable, whence actions to quiet title which apply only to an "estate
or interest in real property, whether the same be legal or equitable." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 527.150 (1953).
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It is out of these special attributes of land, making up the Gestalt
of real property (as opposed to the "goods" of the Code), that there
arise those repeated dramatic vignettes with which the Chancellors
were continually faced-the abused old and unsophisticated young, the
slicker and the farmer, the money lender and the expectant heir.2 19 This
cast of characters, to a large extent determined by the nature of the
commodity, led to the various forms of overreaching which, while not
quite adding up to fraud or duress, formed the pictures of bargaining
processes which the chancellors declared "unconscionable." But mark:
all of these are pictures of individual overreachings. In other words,
more important than the uniqueness of each piece of land (but con-
nected with it) is the uniqueness of each land transaction. The
dramatic situations which were presented and decided under the equity
unconscionability doctrine were most particularly those kinds of over-
reaching which take place, and can only take place, when there is
individualized bargaining. The equity criteria are fitted only to
nonmass transactions.
And that is precisely what the Code in general and section 2-302
in particular is not designed to cover. The unconscionability section
of the Code is primarily focused on the merchant-to-merchant form-pad
deal, the merchant-to-consumer adhesion transaction, the modem mass-
sale transaction.' To decide whether one of these mass transactions
is to be allowed to stand, the discriminations and discussions by the
equity courts of various gradations of quasi-fraud and quasi-duress are
about as useful as a goiter. Section 2-302 is a child of the mass
transaction, and the state of health of little old ladies and the shade of
rapaciousness of their favorite nephews is not going to inform one's
decision. Thus, all of the jolly references to the good old equity doc-
trine, 21 if they are supposed to indicate a source for determining
procedural unconscionability under the Code, are woefully misguided
and misguiding. Equity dealt with the pathology of bargaining. The
Code deals with the pathology of nonbargaining.
Substantive Unconscionability in Equity
If, then, the references to the equity doctrine are to be other than
delusive, the mass of equity cases must help to define the kinds of con-
219 See notes 185-202 supra.
220 Cf. Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 3, 19 n.78 (1951); Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 MODERN L. REv. 167, 171 (1964); Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68 HAv.
L. REv. 1 (1954). It is of some interest, I think, that the only thing left to a con-
sumer these days which is anything like a dicker over Dobbin is a bicker over
Blackacre.
221 See note 167 supra.
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tracts and contract clauses (as distinguished from the kinds of con-
tracting behavior) which are unconscionable. Alas, that hope is also
bootless. There is only one thing which equity recognized as sub-
stantive unconscionability: inadequate consideration (or, to put it an-
other way, "gross overall imbalance"). It is instructive, I think, that
the Campbell Soup case,' the only link (other than mere verbal simi-
larity) between section 2-302 and equity unconscionability is itself an
extraordinarily striking case of overall imbalance. In that case the
contract was totally one-sided.' But the hardship to the defendant
farmer was in no way the result of any harshness in the contract, but
solely the result of the fact that the market value of the commodity he
had sold for future delivery had tripled by the time delivery was due.
The soup company reserved the power to do all sorts of nasty things to
farmer Wentz, but it didn't try. The term that hurt him was the
price term, the ony one, that is, which was presumably negotiable and
fair when set.' In other words, even though there was no causal
connection between the terms of the contract and the hardship on the
defendant, the court nevertheless refused enforcement because the con-
tract itslf was too one-sided. Thus Campbell Soup is not only typical
of the equity cases in general in that the substantive vice in the contract
is gross overall lopsidedness, but it is, so to speak, super-typical (one
is tempted to say archetypal) in that the one-sidedness complained of
was even irrelevant to the harshness complained of.2 6
This important fact, that all of the equity unconscionability deci-
sions really depend upon a finding of inadequate overall consideration,
has been obscured by the fact that the really live issue in this area, the
subject of a controversy lasting centuries, was not whether inadequate
consideration was a necessary cause of the denial of specific per-
formance, but whether it was a sufficient cause. 22" No one doubted
222 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
2 See the court's description of the allegedly objectionable contract terms.
Id. at 83. Through the courtesy of counsel for Mr. Wentz, I was given a photostat
of the entire original contract. As one would have guessed, the court picked out the
"worst" provisions to quote, but the rest of the contract is hardly filled with favors
to the farmer.
224 The one which seems most to have impressed (or depressed) Judge Goodrich
was a provision that any time Campbell for one reason or another could not take
carrots, the farmer could not, without its consent, sell them elsewhere. Id. at 83 n.11.
2 See id. at 81.
226 Of course, one could also just say that the case was silly.
227 See 1 AMES, CASES IN EQUITY JURISDICTION 264 n.2 (1904); CHrAFE &
St PSoN, op. cit. supra note 177, at 1173-93; DE FUNIAK, op. cit. supra note 177, § 95,
at 222-23; FRY, op. cit. supra note 177, §§ 438-59; HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 550-51
(8th ed. 1962); McCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note 177, § 71; MAITLAND, EQUITY
246-47 (1909) ; 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 925-28 (5th ed. Symons 1941) ;
POMEROY, SPECIFIc PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS §§ 192-97 (3d ed. 1926); SNEu.,
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 551-52 (25th ed. Megarry & Baker 1960) ; 1 STORY, EQurry
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that it was a necessary cause, and in the nature of the way in which
the question was presented-as opposition to the specific performance
of a contract-it would be rare that the unfairness of the exchange
would not be at least implicitly asserted. Why else would the transac-
tion be opposed? More important, if the assumption of the uniqueness
of realty were taken seriously, the very opposition to the decree would
be a testament to the defendant's decision that the transaction was
unfair, and that subjective belief would, in equity as to land, be con-
clusive. Thus the only factor of substantive unconscionability which
could be presented in an action for specific performance was that of dis-
proportion of price, i.e., overall imbalance."29 The Code draftsmen,
however, quite specifically determined, after an early impulse to the
contrary, that section 2-302 would be applicable not only to contracts
which were unbalanced in an overall sense, but also to those containing
single "unconscionable" clauses. Since under this approach a separate
substantive determination must be made on a clause-by-clause basis,
the equity doctrine's weighing technique is generally irrelevant.
To summarize, there are two separate social policies which are
embodied in the equity unconscionability doctrine. The first is that
bargaining naughtiness, once it reaches a certain level, ought to avail
the practitioner naught. The second is directed not against bargaining
conduct (except insofar as certain results often are strong evidence of
certain conduct otherwise unproved) but against results, and embodies
the doctrine (also present in laesio enormis statutes) "' that the inflic-
tion of serious hardship demands special justification. The first of
these social policies cannot be reflected in section 2-302 in any helpful
way unless one takes the position that everything in a form contract
or an adhesion contract is to be stricken upon the nondrafting party's
request, for that is the type of transaction with which the section is
designed to deal. The second policy, that harsh results not be per-
mitted irrespective of the fairness of the bargaining process or the
unfairness of the provision at the time of the drafting, is an attractive
JURIsPRUDENcE §§ 244-49, 333 (13th ed. Bigelow 1886) ; WALSH, op. cit. supra note
177, § 104, at 482-89; Note, 25 VA. L. REv. 834 (1939)'; Annot., 65 A.L.R. 7, 80-97
(1930). One may also consult the exceedingly learned opinion of Chancellor Kent
in Seymour v. Delancey, 6 Johns. Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1822), rev'd, 3 Cowen 445
(N.Y. Ct. Err. 1824), for a summary of the controversy up to that date.
2 2 8 Cf. MArrLAND, op. cit. supra note 227, at 238, suggesting that one may want
particular realty even if the money offered in exchange, objectively considered, is
adequate.
229 In fact, so strong was this imbalance element that specific performance might
not be granted even if the contract were fair when made, if subsequent developments
made it oppressive in operation. See, e.g., Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
557 (1869) (decree granted, but with conditions); McCarty v. Kyle, 44 Tenn. 288
(1867).
20 See BucxLAND, TExToox OF ROMAN LAW 486 (3d ed. Stein 1963).
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one because of the ease of its administration; it is not at all hard to
identify a harsh result when it has come about. The difficulty with
adapting that doctrine to the Code provision is that substantially all of
the important provisions in a normal sales contract are potentially ex-
ceedingly harsh. Generally they are inserted to determine who will
stand a loss, perhaps a total loss, if a particular happening happens, or
at least to give a huge litigation advantage to one of the parties should
the question come up. Something as innocuous as a choice-of-law
provision in a contract will operate harshly if the law chosen is un-
favorable to one of the parties."3 ' The same harshness is even more
clearly inherent in a warranty disclaimer; if the warranty question be-
comes material and the disclaimer is upheld, the seller will win and the
buyer will lose. 32 Thus "unconscionability" cannot be equated with
"harshness" as an abstract matter. Certain particular clauses may
indeed be declared impermissible as a matter of policy; that is how a
usury statute operates, and consumer protection statutes embody numer-
ous interdictions of specific contractual provisions.2"3 But the hallmark
of unconscionability cannot be the harshness of the result without more,
because sales clauses are designed to be harsh. Unless one says that
all losses should be split or spread 11 (as has been suggested in special
contexts),25 a harsh result without more, even if the result of an ad-
hesion or form-contract provision, cannot identify the impermissible. 6
2-1 See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
232 A recent example is Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d
225 (1964).
233 See CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDrr LEGISLATION 312-22 (1965), a
chart showing the sundry provisions barred in various states from retail installment
sales contracts.
234 Or at least should be if the person hurt were "poor" perhaps. With respect
to the apparent political difficulties of the open avowal of such a position, note the
Code's propagandists' horrified response to any suggestion that the Code represented
"class legislation." See, e.g., Barney, The Uniform Commercial Code, 7 PORTLAND
U.L. REV. 9, 10 (1961); Beers, The New Commercial Code, 2 Bus. LAW. 14, 17
(1947) ; Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code, 39 ORE. L. REV. 318, 322-23 (1960).
See also note 11 supra on the allied "who-really-drafted-the-Code" controversy.
235 See, e.g., Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: All Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965). This area also seems to have its
emotional aspects. See Calabresi, Fault, Accident and the Wonderful World of Blum
and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965).
236 This simplistic resultant-harshness test was firmly rejected by the draftsmen
of the Code. In the present revision of the Code, no clause may be stricken unless
it was unconscionable "at the time it was made." UCC §2-302(1). While most
likely implicit from the beginning, this was explicitly stated for the first time in 1955,
very late in the drafting history. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SUPPLEMENT No. 1
TO THE 1952 OFFIcIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1955) (containing the changes "voted by Enlarged Editorial Board [of the
Institute] Oct. 29-31, Nov. 13-14, 1954"). The reason, the revisers said, was to "make
it clear that . . . the court in making such a decision is not to apply hindsight but
is rather to consider the question of unconscionability as of the date of formation
of the contract." Id. at 8. Thus the doctrine of at least some of the equity cases,
that subsequently occurring hardship alone might prevent a contract's specific enforce-
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If the unconscionability of a clause at the time it was made cannot
be determined by looking at its eventual harsh effect then the test of
unconscionability to be applied to any individual clause of a commercial
contract is no further clarified. When is a warranty disclaimer "un-
conscionable"? Not, obviously, when it succeeds in disclaiming a war-
ranty, but when it is as a matter of social policy "bad" that the warranty
be disclaimable. When is that? One can argue about the answer, but
at least when the question is asked in that way, one is arguably arguing
about the right sub-questions, not about the content of an nth level
abstraction like "unconscionability." Alas, 2-302 steers the latter
course.2
7
SEcTioN 2-302 (2)
As we have seen, when the question is presented as a decision as
to the "unconscionability" of a single contractual provision, the vacuous-
ness of the standard is apparent. This led, eventually, to at least one
attempt to modify the section to supply an internal method by which
the definitional void might be filled. This, of course, was 2-302(2),
and the very limited effect of this subsection helps to clarify even more,
I think, the fundamental drafting misconception of section 2-302. Sec-
tion 2-302(2) reads as follows:
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination.
Its genesis is clearer than that of just about any other element in sec-
tion 2-302. It did not appear in the 1950 draft of the Code. Late in
January 1951, the Enlarged Editorial Board for the Code met before
the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American
ment, was rejected. And it was rejected even though the New York Law Revision
Commission specifically suggested that after-the-fact harshness be covered by § 2-302.
See AssOciATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 27-28 (1962).
27 One other difference between the equity doctrine and § 2-302 should be men-
tioned here. Under the equity doctrine, the result of a refusal to enforce was, at
least theoretically, not total failure of the plaintiff's cause, but only a remission to
his rights "at law." Such "right" at law in fact might not exist. One empirical
study (dealing, however, with only fifty-six cases) has suggested that as a general
rule one who loses in equity loses for good. Frank & Endicott, Defenses in Equity
and "Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REv. 380 (1954). One suspects, however, that the
Chancellors thought there was a real remedy at law, and that the litigants did too;
else the actions for cancellation and the judges' agonizing over them make little sense.
See, e.g., Day v. Newman, 2 Cox 77, 83, 30 Eng. Rep. 36, 38 (Ch. 1788).
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Bar Association for hearings2ss On January 28, Walter D. Malcolm
reported that the Section's Committee on the Code had just defeated
a proposal to strike section 2-302 altogether, but only by a five-to-five
voteY 9 Professor Robert Braucher of Harvard then rose.
I have an additional suggestion . . . and was directed to
present this by the Council of the Bar Association Section.
That would be to add a second sentence to this provision, the
purpose of which would be to try to help a court which passes
on the question of whether a contract or a clause is uncon-
scionable.
To understand the setting in which it is working, the
sentence which I would propose would be the second sentence
in 2-302:
When it is claimed or appears to the court that
the contract or any clause thereof may be uncon-
scionable, the court may afford the parties an oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial
setting, purpose, and effect as used.
I think that violates Mr. Luther's principle that you
should not have procedure in this Code, but if you are going
to give the court a charter to inquire into whether the grey
goods trade has regulated itself properly under the Worth
Street Rules, or whether the form of contract used gen-
erally by the canners is unconscionable, it would be desirable
to have some reminder that there are complications known in
the trade, and that what appears on its face to be unfair or
unconscionable may not be in the light of conditions in the
trade.2 0
Professor Llewellyn's reaction to this suggestion was more than re-
ceptive; it would not be unfair to call it ecstatic:
The Drafting Staff will welcome that, will welcome such
a subsection. It clarifies definitely the meaning of the Section
and addresses the court's attention to vitally important
stuff.
241
This reaction ought not to have been unanticipated. In his personal
comments to the very first version of 2-302, Professor Llewellyn wrote:
238 A transcript of these hearings exists in mimeographed form. Proceedings
of the Larger Editorial Board of the American Law Institute, January 27-28, 1951
[hereinafter cited as Proceedings]. In addition, a report on this meeting was included
at 6 Bus. LAW. 164 (1951), which included some quotations from the verbatim
transcript. I shall give parallel citations to both sources.
239 Proceedings at 171; 6 Bus. LAW. at 184.
240 Proceedings at 173-74; 6 Bus. LAW. at 185.
241 Proceedings at 174; 6 Bus. LAW. at 185. Note particularly Professor
Llewellyn's use of the exceedingly nonpictorial "stuff."
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The one-sided group of clauses which are fair, but are
needed to give protection against bad law.
Many groups of clauses in very frequent use in the Sales
field are utterly one-sided, but are, for all that, entirely fair
because they correct in a reasonable way an unfortunate con-
dition of the law. The most frequent of these are seller's
clauses protecting against various types of business impos-
sibility, and protecting against the obligation of delivery on
credit to a buyer who has become a risk.242
At any rate, the draftsmen of section 2-302(2) seem to have felt that
it filled a need.243 It was no sooner proposed than integrated into the
act, in almost exactly the words proposed by Professor Braucher,'
and thereafter it was carried forward into the present draft of the Code
without substantial change.
Certainly the idea was sound enough. If judges were to be given
the power to regulate the agreements within industries on an ad hoc
basis, then, as Professor Braucher suggested, it would be useful if they
were given the opportunity to learn, if only on an ad hoc basis, a little
something about the industries they were regulating. Obviously what
the sponsors of this new subsection had in mind was testimony on the
technical business requirements of particular business complexes, per-
haps on the order of a statistical defense on the basis of long-time ex-
perience of, let us say, the very tough seller-oriented insecurity provi-
sion provided in the Worth Street Rules mentioned by Professor
Braucher." 5 And to this extent section 2-302 (2) serves an important
purpose: it makes possible the resuscitation of a provision which,
though to the uninitiated might appear unreasonable, has a particular,
reasonable job to do in a particular industry.2 40
Does section 2-302(2), however, really give any help in defining
substantive unconscionability in any case in which the question is likely
242 MIMEO 1941 DRaFT § 1-C, comment A(6).
243 Professor Braucher indicates that one of the needs it filled was to lessen dis-
satisfaction over the result in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.
1948), in which the unconscionability point had been decided without the help of
much warning, briefing or evidence. Braucher, Sale of Goods in the Uniform Coin-
mnercial Code, 26 LA. L. REv. 192, 203-04 (1966).
244 The only change was that the last two words "as used" were replaced by
the phrase, "to aid the court in making the determination." See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, MAY MEETING REVISIONS TO PROPosED FINAL
DRAFT No. 2 (1951).
245 Worth Street Rules, Standard Cotton Textile Salesnote IV(2) (1941). Com-
pare UCC § 2-609.
246 One is reminded of those cases, often brought up when the nature of "am-
biguity" for parol-evidence-rule purposes is at issue, in which within a particular
trade, white means black, and so forth. See Mitchell v. Henry, 15 Ch. D. 181 (1880)
("white selvage" meaning dark selvage); Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728, 110
Eng. Rep. 266 (K.B. 1832) ("thousand" meaning 1200 in the rabbit trade).
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to arise? Let us assume that a case comes up in which a man has been
fast-talked into signing a contract by which he will have to pay roughly
three times the "value" of some goods . 47  Now let us imagine the
scene when the plaintiff goes on the stand to "present evidence as to
[the contract's] commercial setting, purpose and effect." 248 It
seems to me that the scene might go something like this:
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL: Mr. Greed, as President of plaintiff
corporation you set that company's
policy, don't you?
MAX GREED: Certainly. I own it all.
COUNSEL: What would you say was the pur-
pose of the contract that you en-
tered into with Mr. Maclver?
GREED: To make a lot of money.
COUNSEL: And what was the effect?
GREED: I made a lot of money.
COUNSEL: What would happen if you charged
less ?
GREED: I'd make less money.
COUNSEL: Mr. Greed, doesn't your conscience
bother you?
GREED: Wha?
Or instead let us consider the case of a poor, ignorant lady, with
seven children, who signed a contract (pursuant to which she bought
a stereo set she couldn't afford) making all goods bought from a certain
seller, whenever bought, security for any outstanding balance owed
the seller, such that on default he could take anything back, even things
really already paid for.24 That hearing might sound as follows:
BUYER'S COUNSEL: Mr. Walker-Thomas, what is the pur-
pose of this so-called "add-on clause"?
SELLER: It gives us an extra hook over the
buyers. Sometimes you can squeeze a
little more out by repossessing some of
the items bought earlier and reselling
them. It makes it easier to convince
the buyers that if they don't pay up
they're going to get hurt bad.
24 7 Cf. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A2d
886 (1964), discussed at length in text accompanying notes 254-66 infra.
24 8UCC §2-302(2).
249 Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), remanding 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1964), discussed at length in
text accompanying notes 268-91 infra.
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SELLER:
COUNSEL:
SELLER:
COUNSEL:
SELLER:
COUNSEL:
SELLER:
COUNSEL:
SELLER:
COUNSEL:
SELLER:
Or finally, to round things off, how about some testimony in the
context of the standard automobile warranty disclaimer that figured in
the Henningsen case."' Since we had an oligopolistic industry in-
volved there let us put on the stand in Greek-chorus fashion the chief
executive officers of the major automobile manufacturers.
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL:
DEFENDANTS:
COUNSEL:
DEFENDANTS:
COUNSEL:
DEFENDANTS:
COUNSEL:
DEFENDANTS:
COUNSEL:
DEFENDANTS:
What is the purpose of the warranty
disclaimer in your contracts?
It helps to increase profits.
Do you all have such a provision?
But of course.
Why?
We all like to increase profits.
What would happen if you were
barred from that clause?
We'd increase profits some other
way. We're an oligopoly, you
know.
Don't your consciences bother you?
Beg your pardon?
25o Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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What is the effect of this provision?
It's hard to tell, but we think it helps a
little.
Helps do what?
Helps make more money.
What about commercial setting? Does
everybody use this clause?
How would I know? What am I, some
kind of conspiracy? I guess whoever
can use it uses it.
What would happen if you didn't use
such a provision in your contract?
I'd make less money.
What if you sold only to people who
could afford it?
I'd make much less money.
Doesn't your conscience bother you?
Wha?
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The point of all this is to emphasize that the kind of technical testi-
mony which the draftsmen apparently had in mind as being tendered
pursuant to section 2-302 (2) is testimony which need never be tendered
by anyone defending his contract. There is no clause in a contract that
is "needed" by a party; it is certainly true that no one needs an entire
contract to be one-sided. It is useful for a seller to be able to refuse
to ship goods any time he gets nervous about the buyer's credit.2 51 It is
useful for a party to protect himself against forms of increased difficulty
of performance which do not rise to the level of common-law "im-
possibility." 22 It is even more obviously useful to disclaim warranties
or to limit one's liability to essentially nothing. But not being able to
provide for any of these things by contract would only take from a party
one of the "edges" his lawyer had tried to get for him in his form
contract. The removal of the edge would presumably find its way
into the final price to be charged, if that were feasible.253 But how
does a court decide if taking that particular edge is not to be permitted
if in its "commercial setting" its "purpose and effect" is to increase a
party's profits? Is the evidence to be focused on the last few years'
profit picture in the industry, or of the particular party, to see if he
has been making enough money to cut down on his competitive ad-
vantages? Should there also be testimony about the particular party's
competitive position vis-A-vis his competitors, to see if he can stand
a few new risks? Perhaps there should, but I do find it unlikely. What
seems to me more likely is that section 2-302(2), as promising as it
reads, and as useful as it is for showing the conscionability of clauses
that didn't look it, gives little aid to one trying to find out when a
clause in a commercial contract is "unconscionable." Once again, this
is because a warranty disclaimer is not "like" a remedy limitation, and
both of them are not "like," say, a choice-of-law provision. Any of
these clauses might well be regulated, but one cannot decide any of
the questions relevant to the form of that regulation so long as one is
trying not to decide a question of social policy but to flesh out an
incantation.
251 See Worth Street Rules, Standard Cotton Textile Salesnote IV(2) (1941).
252 Cf. MImEo 1941 DRAFr § l-C, comment A (6).
23 It is amusing, in a grim sort of way, that persons in a monopolistic or oligopo-
listic position, who are therefore most likely to use contracts of adhesion, are simul-
taneously in the best position to pass on to the entire market the losses and costs
which they would supposedly bear if the adhesion contracts were forbidden them.
It has also been noted that who does eventually bear the costs of shifted risks
is exceedingly hard to pin down. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) ; Morris, Enterprise Liabilities and
the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961);
Note, 70 YALE L.J. 453, 455-56 (1961).
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TH CASES "USING" 2-302
As the history of 2-302, and the suggested guides to its operation
have now been discussed, it is time to analyze those cases in which 2-302
has so far been actually involved. Strictly speaking, only one reported
case relies upon section 2-302 of the Code even as an alternative ground
of holding.25 4  In American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver,25
the plaintiff was in the business of selling and installing home improve-
ments. It agreed with the defendant to "furnish and install 14 com-
bination windows and one door" and "flintcoat the side walls" on
defendant's home, all for $1,759.00. Since the defendant was ap-
parently unwilling or unable to pay cash, the plaintiff undertook to
arrange long-term financing, and furnished defendant with an applica-
tion to a finance company (apparently in some way allied or affiliated
with the plaintiff). This application was shortly "accepted," and
defendant was notified in writing that his payments for the improve-
ments would be $42.81 per month for sixty months (a grand total of
$2,568.60) which included "principal, interest and life and disability
insurance." Plaintiff commenced work, but after it had completed only
a negligible portion of the job it was asked by defendant to stop and
it complied, thereafter suing defendant for damages for breach of
contract. 56
On these facts, the New Hampshire court need never have reached
any unconscionability question. There was in effect in the jurisdiction
a "truth-in-lending" statute " which applied to the transaction. The
-4 This is not strictly true, perhaps. One Referee in Bankruptcy recently held
two security agreements "unconscionable," purportedly relying on UCC §2-302.
Matter of Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co. (E.D. Pa.); Matter of Dorset Steel Equipment Co.
(E.D. Pa.), both described at 39 REF. J. 115-16 (1965). On appeal, the District
Court remanded both cases for further factual development, but declined specifically
to hold § 2-302 applicable to nonsales agreements. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253
F. Supp. 864, 873 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
=55 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964). The case has been interestingly com-
mented upon. 78 HARV. L. REv. 895 (1965). The facts are presented as part of an
agreed statement, 105 N.H. at 436-37, 201 A.2d at 886-87.
256 The plaintiff quite properly did not claim the contract price. See UCC §§ 2-708,
2-709.
2-7 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-B :2 (Supp. 1965) forbids the extension of credit
unless at the time thereof the borrower is furnished
a clear statement in writing setting forth the finance charges, expressed in
dollars, rate of interest, or monthly rate of charge, or a combination thereof,
to be borne by such person in connection with such extension of credit as
originally scheduled.
The court concluded reasonably enough that the requirements of this statute had not
been met by the plaintiffs, and that
In the circumstances of the present case . . . the purpose of the dis-
closure statute will be implemented by denying recovery to the plaintiff on
its contract and granting the defendants' motion to dismiss.
105 N.H. at 439, 201 A.2d at 888.
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court could have relied upon that statute to strike the contract, and
indeed did so as an alternative ground of decision. But the court most
specifically made it a point not to rest its decision solely upon the dis-
closure statute. It said:
There is another and independent reason why the re-
covery should be barred in the present case because the trans-
action was unconscionable. "The courts have often avoided
the enforcement of unconscionable provisions in long printed
standardized contracts, in part by the process of 'interpreta-
tion' against the parties using them, and in part by the method
used by Lord Nelson at Copenhagen." 1 Corbin, Contracts,
s. 128 (1963). Without using either of these methods
reliance can be placed upon the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C. 2-302(1)) [quotation of section omitted] ....
Inasmuch as the defendants have received little or nothing
of value and under the transaction they entered into they
were paying $1,609 for goods and services valued at far less,
the contract should not be enforced because of its unconscion-
able features. This is not a new thought or a new rule in this
jurisdiction. See Morrill v. Bank, 90 N.H. 358, 365, 9 A.2d
519, 525; "It has long been the law in this state that con-
tracts may be declared void because unconscionable and
oppressive .... 2 "
All right, then. As of the time of writing, the only case which
has relied upon section 2-302 as a basis of decision has decided that
"unconscionable" means "too expensive." 259 And certainly there is no
immutable principle displayed in fixed stars that would make that
particular meaning of unconscionable inconceivable. I have earlier
suggested that in fact that was the primary meaning of unconscionability
in some of the early drafts of the Code, and that it was its only meaning
as used by courts of equity. Certainly the idea that a strikingly dis-
2 5 8 Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 888-89. The Morrill case cited by the Court in Mac-
Iver, Morrill v. Amoskeag Say. Bank, 90 N.H. 358, 9 A.2d 519 (1939), cites for
the proposition quoted from it (which, by the way, is dictum) five other cases, Villa
v. Rodriguez, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 323 (1871); Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 139 (1851) ; Bither v. Packard, 115 Me. 306, 98 Atl. 129 (1916) ; Smith v.
Smith, 82 N.H. 399, 135 Atl. 25 (1926) ; Houghton v. Page, 2 N.H. 42 (1819). The
contract in the last-named case was not enforced because it violated a governing
usury statute of the locus contraches. All of the other cited cases (including Morrill)
were actions in equity except the Bither case, which, however, was a mortgagor-
mortgagee case of which the court said "though the form or proceeding is in law,
it is equitable in spirit and purpose." 115 Me. at 312, 98 At. at 932.
2-59 The only commentary devoted to Maclver seems to agree with that reading
of its holding. The headnote to the discussion at 78 HARV. L. REv. 895 (1965) reads
"Uniform Commercial Code-Construction-Inadequacy of Consideration is Sufficient
To Establish Unconscionableness of Contract." Professor Braucher agrees. See
Braucher, supra note 243, at 205, for a similar reading.
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proportionate exchange should be voidable has not destroyed the com-
merce of the many jurisdictions which utilize a laesio enormis doctrine
in one form or another.26 On the other hand one may certainly
speculate on whether the legislatures which have flocked to embrace
the Code 26' would have been willing to adopt a provision which frankly
and openly declared that overcharges of some large but unspecified
degree could be invalidated by courts on an ad hoc basis, at least as
part of a commercial code.
Let us assume, however, that a system of jurisprudence ought to
have some way to deal with transactions in which one party is giving
up vastly more than he is getting, and that this purpose is at least one
of those that section 2-302 is designed to serve.212  Even given that
assumption, one has still to ask whether the best way to inject that
supervisory power into the law is to subsume it under a high-level
abstraction like "unconscionability." After all, a laesio enormis type
of statute is not very hard to draft, as either a flat-percentage or a
"grossly-too-much" provision. The decision in the Maclver case ex-
poses the weaknesses of abstraction so deliciously that it justifies
esurient consideration. Let me quote the court's total discussion of
why the contract was unconscionable.
In examining the exhibits and agreed facts in this case
we find that to settle the principal debt of $1,759 the de-
fendants signed instruments obligating them to pay $42.81
for 60 months, making a total payment of $2,568.60, or an
increase of $809.60 over the contract price. In reliance upon
the total payment the defendants were to make, the plaintiffs
pay a sales commission of $800. Counsel suggests that the
goods and services to be furnished the defendants thus had
a value of $959, for which they would pay an additional
$1,609.60 computed as follows:
"Value of goods and services $ 959.00
Commission 800.00
Interest and carrying charges 809.60 1,609.60
Total payment $2,568.60" 263
260 E.g., CODE CIVIL art. 1134 (Fr. 58th ed. 1959) ( 12 of value); CIVIL CODE
§ 138 (Ger. 10th ed. Palandt 1952) ("strikingly disproportionate"), LA. CiV. CODE
ANN. art. 1861(2) (West 1952) (Y2 of value). Moreover, according to an exceedingly
interesting recent book, the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia also know fair-price and
laesio enormis doctrines. See GLUcxmN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE
192-93 (1965). So much for you, Tom Hobbes.
261 Forty-nine as of December, 1966. See 3 BENDER's UNIFORM CommERCIAL
CODE SERVICE vi (Duesenberg & King eds.) (1966).
262 It is, in fact, hypothesized in another section of the Code as one of the purposes
of the whole law of warranty. See UCC § 2-313, comment 4.
263 105 N.H. at 438-39, 201 A.2d at 888.
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This is breathtaking economics. Note first of all the court's assumption
that the seller's cost of distribution (his presumably-fast-talking sales-
man's commission) is no part of the "value" of the goods to the pur-
chaser, so that it must be totally eliminated from any evaluation of the
fairness of the exchange. On this reasoning, the salary of sales staff
is not a factor fairly to be considered when deciding the fairness of a
retail price. (This is not to say that a grotesquely uneconomic form
of distribution enriches one who purchases from the distributor; it does,
however, suggest that life is not so easy that the commission may
simply be "drilled out" of the "value" in evaluating the fairness of
the exchange.)
Then we come to the treatment of the "interest and carrying
charges" by the court. Here it seems that it is enough for the judge
that the amount certainly looks like a great deal. He makes absolutely
no attempt to work out what the true effective yearly rate of interest
is for this five-year pay out. Actually it works out to a bit over 18%
per annum.2 " This may seem high, but it is not out of line with the
rates permitted under statutes which regulate installment purchases and
loans, not to mention rates charged where not regulated.2  The im-
portant matter, however, is not whether this rate is "fair" or not; it is
that the court in this case went on nothing but guesswork to reach its
decision, examined none of the relevant considerations and was en-
couraged by 2-302 to behave in just that way.266 Had the section been
in less abstract terms, perhaps an examination of the relevant factors
would have taken place. It does seem that a judge who is forced to
264 The formula for finding the annual simple interest rate for any time period
or amount when based on a monthly repayment schedule may be expressed:
24C =-R
L (N + 1)
where C is the cost of the loan, L is the amount of the loan, N is the number of
payments to be made and R is the annual simple interest rate. See Willging, Install-
ment Credit: A Social Prospective, 15 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 45, 66 (1966) for a more
generalized form of this equation. In the MacIver case the calculation is:
24 X 810
= 18.1%
1759 X 61
and this assumes that the "life and disability insurance" included is part of the
"interest!' charge. (If one gives no "value" to the salesman's commission, then the
calculation yields a bit over 33%.)
265 See CuRRAN, TRENDS IN CoNsumER CREDrr LEGISLATION 69 n.558, 270-77
(1965), for the regulated rates. The first tentative draft of a Uniform Consumer
Credit Code calls for a maximum rate of 18%. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1966, p. 39,
cols. 1 & 2. The New Hampshire statute, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 399-B:2-8
(Supp. 1965), has no maximum charge provided. In states without rate regulation
it is believed that the actual rates charged may range between 12% and 275%. See
Fand, Competition and Regulation in the Consumer Credit Markets, 20 PERSONAL
FINANCE L.Q. REP. 18, 23 (1965).
266 In fairness, it should be pointed out that the plaintiff-appellee filed no brief
at all on appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. See 105 N.H. at 437, 201
A.2d at 887.
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recognize by the form of the statute upon which he is relying that he
is supposed to evaluate the actual economic exchange is likely to feel
called upon to see what that exchange in fact is, and how it accords with
contemporary practices. When the key evaluative word, however, is a
description of the judge's own state of mind rather than of the situation
which might be justified in producing such a state, the likelihood that
the court will even examine the relevant questions is severely lessened.
6 7
As noted earlier, the Maclver case is the only one reported which
has relied upon 2-302 as a basis of decision. One very recent case,
however, which has attracted substantial attention from the com-
mentators, clearly would have been decided on the basis of 2-302 had
the statute been in effect at the time of the relevant transaction, and
in fact was decided as if the section were the law of the jurisdiction.
In that case, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,26 the appel-
lant, a Mrs. Williams, "a person of limited education separated from
her husband," 269 had, during the period 1957-1962, purchased "a
number of household items" 270 from appellee furniture company on
printed-form installment sale contracts (in the transparent guise of
leases). One sentence in this printed contract, part of "a long para-
graph in extremely fine print" 271 had the net effect of keeping
a balance due on every item purchased until the balance due
on all items, whenever purchased, was liquidated. As a result,
the debt incurred at the time of purchase of each item was
secured by the right to repossess all the items previously pur-
chased by the same purchaser .... '7'
When Mrs. Williams' outstanding balance was only $164, she bought
a $515 stereo phonograph set. 73 At the time of this purchase, the
267 The court's sole reference, by the way, to the procedural unconscionability
problems is the following quote from Corbin:
"The courts have often avoided the enforcement of unconscionable provisions
in long printed standardized contracts, in part by the process of 'interpreta-
tion' against the parties using them, and in part by the method used by Lord
Nelson at Copenhagen." 105 N.H. at 439, 201 A.2d at 888.
263 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), remanding 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1964). The case has occasioned extensive commentary. See, e.g., Schneider, Un-
conscionable Contract Unenforceable, 20 PERSONAL. FINANCE L.Q. REP. 32 (1965);
15 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 269 (1966) ; 54 GEo. L.J. 703 (1966) ; 79 HARv. L. REv. 1299
(1966); 12 How. LJ. 164 (1966) ; 44 TEXAS L. REv. 803 (1966).
269 198 A.2d at 915.
270 This abstract classification is that of the Court of Appeals. 350 F.2d at 447.
The lower court opinion is, interestingly enough, not as reticent, spelling out the
items as "sheets, curtains, rugs, chairs, a chest of drawers, beds, mattresses, a washing
machine." 198 A.2d at 915.
The Williams case had a companion case involving a Mr. Thorne and Walker-
Thomas, which was also remanded. Mr. Thorne had purchased instead of a stereo
set, "an item described as a Daveno, three tables, and two lamps." 350 F.2d at 447.
Mr. Thorne's marital status and number of children are not described.
271198 A.2d at 915.
2,72 350 F2d at 447.
273 350 F.2d at 447 & n.1.
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furniture company was perfectly aware (since the information was
endorsed on the back of the installment contract) that Mrs. Williams'
sole income 274 was a government payment (apparently some species
of relief) of $218 per month. The Circuit Court opinion also indicated
that the store knew that Mrs. Williams was supposed to support herself
and her seven children on that amount (though that seems not to have
been endorsed on the back of the contract)275 At any rate, the stereo
set was apparently just too great a burden for the $218 per month to
bear. Mrs. Williams defaulted, the store replevied every item it could
lay its hands on and won in the trial court and the intermediate appeals
court. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, the case was remanded to make findings on the
issue of unconscionability.
276
For those of us who have an instinctive and infallible sense of
justice (and which of us does not), any other result in this case is
unimaginable. But there are grounds for quibbling about the court's
(and the Code's) methodology. Judge Wright found unconscionability
easy to describe:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to in-
clude an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of
the parties together with contract terms which are unreason-
ably favorable to the other party. . . . [In the footnote which
supports this statement, citation is to Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), and
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948)
only.] In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is
negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.
2 77
That is, there is immediate recognition that unconscionability has to
have two foci, the negotiation which led to the contract and that
contract's terms. As for the procedural aspect, while there is no find-
ing that this was the only credit furniture store open to Mrs. Williams,
or that even if it were not, they all had substantially the same contract
(which was the situation in the Henningsen case 27 so heavily relied
274 Actually, there is no finding that Mrs. Williams had no other source of income,
but one assumes that if she had, one of the courts, most likely the Municipal Court
of Appeals, would have mentioned it.
275 See 350 F.2d at 448. Presumably after fourteen contracts over a five-year
period, see 12 How. L.J. 164, 168-69 (1966), Mrs. Williams' home status was the
subject of common banter among the Walker-Thomas folks.
276 350 F2d at 450.
2
77Id. at 449. Compare § 2-302, comment 1: "The principle [of the section]
is . . . not [one] of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
powern'
278 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NXJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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upon by the court), one may assume that the form Mrs. Williams
signed was essentially the only kind of form open to her. A person's
"relevant market" may fairly be the one he can reasonably be expected
to know about or dare to use. In other words, the local stores may
be a local person's relevant market because of his ignorance, and if
they are all as one on something, as to him they are a monopoly. And
besides, in this case the court made an almost-finding of contracting
procedures which went beyond the mere use of a form or even of a
contract of adhesion, which reached, in fact, at least some level of
quasi-fraud. Judge Wright asks:
Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious educa-
tion or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand
the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden
in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales
practices ? 279
There was apparently no problem with the answer, for after giving
lip service to the "usual rule" 28' that one who signs an agreement is
bound to all of its terms, he said:
But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little
real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with
little or no knowledge of its terms . . . . the usual rule . . .
should be abandoned ....
It is hard to fault the court's argument on the procedural unconscion-
ability aspects of this case. While it might sometimes be difficult to
decide whether a species or level of bargaining ought to protect a
contract from section 2-302, it is not difficult here. If the unconscion-
ability section is to be applicable to any contract, it must be to one
"bargained" as this one was.
But there is no need to labor this point. Finding that the bar-
gaining procedure involved will not insulate the contract from judicial
scrutiny under section 2-302 is only the first and less difficult step in
the process of using that section. Once one decides that the contract
is vulnerable to judicial meddling, there still remains to be decided
whether the provision or contract is "unconscionable." For that deter-
mination Judge Wright also articulated a test:
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary
concern must be with the terms of the contract considered
279 350 F.2d at 449.
280 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 70 (1932).
281 350 F.2d at 449. Compare § 2-302, comment 1: "The principle [of the section]
is . . . not [one] of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargainingpower."
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in light of the circumstances existing when the contract was
made. The test is not simple, nor can it be mechanically
applied. The terms are to be considered "in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of
the particular trade or case" [citing "Comment, Uniform
Commercial Code sec. 2-307," but obviously meaning 2-302].
Corbin suggests the test as being whether the terms are "so
extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores
and business practices of the time and place." . . . We
think this formulation correctly states the test to be applied
in those cases where no meaningful choice was exercised upon
entering the contract. 2
How does that test apply to the Williams facts? What is it about
Mrs. Williams' contract which is "unconscionable"? Surprisingly, the
answer is not clear, even about what in the contract is bad. It seems,
however, that there are two possibilities. First, it may be that the
provision by which each item purchased became security for all items
purchased was the objectionable feature of the contract. Or it might
be that the furniture company sold this expensive stereo set to this
particular party which forms the unconscionability of the contract. If
the vice is the add-on clause, then one encounters the now-familiar
problem: such a clause is hardly such a moral outrage as by itself
meets Judge Wright's standard of being "so extreme as to appear un-
conscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time
and place." The lower court in the Williams case called attention,'
for instance, to a Maryland statute regulating retail installment sales 84
under which Mrs. Williams might have been relieved, noting with
regret that the statute was not in effect in the District. What was not
pointed out by the lower court (and certainly not by the upper court)
was that the State of Maryland had found nothing illegal per se about
add-on provisions, in fact specifically permitting them and setting out
to regulate them in some detail S5 Of the thirty-seven jurisdictions
which have statutes regulating retail installment sales, only one has a
provision making add-on clauses impermissible.280 In such circum-
stances it does seem a bit much to find "so extreme as to appear un-
conscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time
2,82350 F.2d at 450.
288 198 A.2d at 916.
284 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 128-53 (1965).
2 85 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 137 (1965).
2 86As of 1965. See CURRAN, TRENDS in CONSUMER CaRErr LEosISLATIoN 312-22
(1965). A bill proposed for the District of Columbia would apparently at least
regulate the use of the add-on provisions. See 12 How. L.J. 164, 172 (1966).
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and place" 187 an add-on clause in the District of Columbia which is
used and statutorily permitted almost everyplace else, including con-
tiguous Maryland. One's gorge can hardly be expected to rise with
such nice geographic selectivity.
If one is not convinced that the unconscionability inheres in the
add-on provision, it may be argued that it inheres in the contract as
a whole, in the act of having sold this expensive item to a poor person
knowing of her poverty. This is quite clearly the primary significance
of the case to some of the commentators."' That is the kind of action
which the Maryland statute does not deal with, nor do any of the
statutes like it: the unconscionability of aiding or encouraging a person
to live beyond his means (without much hope of eventual success).
Well, why not make that "unconscionable" for purposes of section
2-302? After all, in this case Walker-Thomas did know for a fact
that Mrs. Williams was on relief; they knew her income and needs
with great particularity: $218 per month and seven children. This
case does not present any of the sticky close questions of how much
of what a seller would have to know (or inquire about) before being
deemed to know that the buyer shouldn't buy.s ° Moreover, what Mrs.
Williams bought this time was a stereo record player. No one could
argue that such an article is a "necessity" to a relief client, and thus
the dissenting judge's suggestion that "what is a luxury to some may
seem an outright necessity to others" 290 hardly applies in this case.
Who can doubt but that this purchase was a frill? 29' So in this case
all we would have is a holding that one cannot enforce a contract
pursuant to which one has sold luxuries to a poor person (or at least
one on relief) with knowledge or reason to know that he will not be
able to pay for them. This is just another class distinction, and dis-
tinctions among persons on the bases of the "class" to which they
belong, that is, on the basis of some common supra-personal charac-
287 350 F.2d at 450.
288 For instance, the subheading of Schneider, Unconscionable Contract Unen-
forceable, 20 PERsoAI. FINAxCE L.Q. RE'. 32 (1965), is "Sale of Stereo to Woman on
Relief." See also 44 TEXAS L. REv. 803 (1966) : "a court may refuse on the ground of
unconscionability to enforce a contract where there is an overextension of credit." The
great interest shown in the opinion as to Mrs. Williams' financial status and the
prominence given her relief status seems to express a similar feeling about the case's
real significance.
289 For simplicity's sake we will leave Mr. Thorne out of this. See note 270 supra.
290 350 F.2d at 450.
291 But see LEwis, FvE FAmILIES 134-36 (1959), for the story of a Mexican
slum dweller who bought a "combination radio, record player, and television set"
on time, intending to rent its use to his neighbors until it was paid for and then
(having left it carefully cartoned and protected) resell it as new. One is not told
how the plan finally worked out.
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teristics, is exceedingly common in the law 29' (not to mention life).
Such a process immensely simplifies decision by limiting the required
inquiry to the person's membership in the class. Once that determina-
tion is made, a certain legal result will flow. The classic instance is the
majority-minority dichotomy. Persons under twenty-one cannot, as a
general rule, make self-binding contracts. This may be considered a
shorthand form of a syllogism which would go something like (a) per-
sons lacking sufficient probity ought not to be allowed to bind them-
selves; (b) all persons under twenty-one lack sufficient probity; (c)
persons under twenty-one cannot bind themselves. This illustrates
some of the strengths and weakneses of the class system. The rule is
easy to administer because a party's age is much easier to determine
than his probity. The difficulty is that the easier the classification the
less likely it is to be accurate, because classes are, in fact, hardly ever
wholly homogeneous. In our case, for instance, the "minor premise"
is false; not all persons under twenty-one lack sufficient probity to
bind themselves.ug
When faced with the difficulties inherent in deciding the bargain-
ing fairness of any given transaction, the equity courts, in working out
their unconscionability doctrine, similarly leaned heavily on relatively
gross classifications. In effect, they seem continually to have taken a
kind of sub rosa judicial notice of the amount of power of certain classes
of people to take care of themselves, often without too much inquiry
into the actual individual bargaining situation. And it is arguable that
sometimes they were wrong; not all old ladies or farmers are without
defenses.2"4 Put briefly, the typical has a tendency to become stereo-
typical, with what may be unpleasant results even for the beneficiaries
of the judicial benevolence. One can see it enshrined in the old English
equity courts' jolly treatment of English seamen as members of a happy,
fun-loving race (with, one supposes, a fine sense of rhythm), but cer-
tainly not to be trusted to take care of themselves.295 What effect, if
any, this had upon the sailors is hidden behind the judicial chuckles
2 92 The usefulness of these group classifications has not gone unnoticed by the
draftsmen of the Code, whose innovations, after all, include the merchant-non-merchant
dichotomy, § 2-104(1). See also Llewellyn, Through Title To Contract and a Bit
Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.L. REV. 159, 160 n.2 (1938): "My own attack would be to . . .
split 'retailer' still further into petty, and large (department store; chain store)."
293 For some recent speculations on infants' contracts in the modern world, see
Note, 41 IND. L.J. 140 (1965).
294For instance, consider farmer Wentz in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172
F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
295 See How v. Weldon, 2 Ves. Sr. 516, 518, 28 Eng. Rep. 330, 331 (Ch. 1754)
("a race of men, loose and unthinking") ; 3 PomEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDCqC § 952
(5th ed. Symons 1941); 1 SToREY, EQurry JURIsPRUDENcE § 332 (13th ed. Bigelow
1886).
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as they protected their loyal sailor boys, but one cannot help wonder-
ing how many sailors managed to get credit at any reasonable price.
In other words, the benevolent have a tendency to colonize, whether
geographically or legally."
Far more economically significant and widespread as an example
of the Chancellors' temptation toward stereotypical jurisprudence is
found in the expectant-heir cases. The most important thing about
expectant-heir cases is that there are expectant-heir cases, classifiable
separately as such in treatises.297 The Chancellors did not find un-
fairness in the price and refuse to enforce because they had no con-
ception of how an expectancy had to be discounted for risk; that kind
of sophistication came early.29 They just set out to protect heirs from
the full effect of their tendency to live beyond their governors' life
expectancies. This was easy to do; it was rare that a judge had to
enter into too long a discussion of the actual facts, or to face the real
basis of his easy decision in the battle between his (there but for the
grace of God) grandson and the most-likely-Jewish moneylender.
After all, he had the rubric "unconscionable" with which to explain (to
himself and to the public) that decision.
Thus, when one asks why a court (like the District of Columbia
Court in the Williams case) ought not be allowed to subsume its social
decisions under a high-level abstraction like "unconscionability," one
may point to the equity cases so many other commentators have pointed
to, but for a different reason. One may suggest that first (and less
important) it tends to make the true bases of decisions more hidden to
those trying to use them as the basis of future planning. But more
important, it tends to permit a court to be nondisclosive about the basis
of its decision even to itself; the class determination is so easy and so
296 See F. Cohen, Indian Wardship: The Twilight of a Myth, in THE LEGAL
CoNsCIENCE 328 (L. Cohen ed. 1960); cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
297 See FONBLANQUE, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 119-22 (4th Am. ed. 1835);
3 POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 953-54 (5th ed. Symons 1941); POMEROY,
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 191 (3d ed. 1926) ; 1 STORY, EQUITY JuRis-
PRUDENCE §§ 333-34 (13th ed. Bigelow 1886). In 1804 Lord Eldon could distinguish
the "cases of reversions and interests of that sort" as a separate class of cases, Coles
v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. Jr. 234, 246, 32 Eng. Rep. 592, 597 (Ch. 1804), and modern
English treatises continue to note them separately. See HORSFrELD, EQurrY IN A
NUTSHELL 181 (1960); SNELI, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 502-03 (25th ed. Megarry &
Baker 1960). In fact, cases are still coming up, e.g., Levin v. Roth, [1950] 1 All
E.R. 698 (C.A.), and the old expectant-heir learning is still discussed. 24 AusTL.
L.J. 158 (1950):
Though of somewhat rare occurrence before the Courts, the application
of the equitable doctrine relating to unconscionable bargains with expectant
heirs should not be forgotten.
295The leading case of Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 28 Eng.
Rep. 82 (Ch. 1750), for instance, contains a sophisticated judicial discussion of the
economic problems involved.
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tempting (and often so heart-warming). More particularly with re-
spect to the Williams case concept that the poor should be discouraged
from frill-buying, no legislature in America could be persuaded openly
to pass such a statute, nor should any be permitted to do so sneakily.
If the selling of frills to the poor is to be discouraged, if the traditional
middle-class virtues of thrift and child care are to be fostered in the
deserving poor by a commercial statute, if one wants to protect a class,
improvident by definition, from the depredations of another class, it is
at least arguable that one should just up and do so-but clearly. 9
This is not to suggest, for a moment, anything as stupid as that some
"freedom-of-contract" concept ought to prevent, for instance, the statu-
tory interdiction of an eleven-hour day. It is only to say that when you
forbid a contractual practice, you ought to have the political nerve
to do so with some understanding (and some disclosure) of what
you are doing. 00
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to describe in some detail the pathology, develop-
mental, morphological and functional, of section 2-302 of the Code and
its official and unofficial commentaries. The gist of the tale is simple:
it is hard to give up an emotionally satisfying incantation, and the way
to keep the glow without the trouble of the meaning is continually to
increase the abstraction level of the drafting and explaining language.
If for one reason or another (in this case the desire to forward the
passage of the whole Code) the academic community is generally
friendly to the drafting effort, a single provision in a massive Code
may get by even if it has, really, no reality referent, and all of its ex-
planatory material ranges between the irrelevant and the misleading.
That this happened with respect to 2-302 the few cases using it are
beginning to show more and more clearly. The world is not going to
come to an end. The courts will most likely adjust, encrusting the
irritating aspects of the section with a smoothing nacre of more or less
reasonable applications, or the legislatures may act if things get out of
299 See 12 How. L.J. 164, 170-72 (1966), for a brief contemplation of such overt
class legislation which is notably lacking in enthusiasm. At least one observer of
the consumer finance scene, however, seems willing to bar the poor from credit.
See CAPLovrrz, THE PooR PAY MORE 191 (1963) ("establish by law minimal credit
requirements").
300 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
continually cited in the Williams case (see 350 F.2d at 448 n.2, 449 nn.6 & 7, 450 n.12),
it is most significant that the court did not have § 2-302 to work with. It was forced,
therefore, to face the relevant policy questions, which it did in a many-paged opinion.
In other words, in Henningsen the New Jersey court was forced to talk about the
basis for its decision; in Williams and Macler the courts were most particularly
enabled not to.
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hand. Commerce in any event is not going to grind to a halt because
of the weaknesses in 2-302. But the lesson of its drafting ought never-
theless to be learned: it is easy to say nothing with words. Even if
those words make one feel all warm inside, the result of sedulously
preventing thought about them is likely to lead to more trouble than
the draftsmen's cozy glow is worth, as a matter not only of statutory
elegance but of effect in the world being regulated. Subsuming prob-
lems is not as good as solving them, and may in fact retard solutions
instead. Or, once more to quote Karl Llewellyn (to whom, after all,
the last word justly belongs), "Covert tools are never reliable tools." 301
3 0 1
LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 365 (1960), quoting Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 HAv. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939).
